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STRONGER THAN EVER:  NEW YORK’S RENT 
STABILIZATION SYSTEM SURVIVES ANOTHER 
LEGAL CHALLENGE 
Charles K. Gehnrich* 
 
The fate of New York’s rent stabilization laws (RSL) directly concerns 
millions of New York City residents who take shelter in the protection of the 
RSL from the hardships and unfair business practices that accompany an 
unregulated housing market during a housing crisis.  After the New York 
State Legislature made these tenant protections stronger than ever before in 
2019, affected landlords responded by petitioning the courts to dismantle the 
entire rent regulation regime.  A federal district court in the Eastern District 
of New York rejected the landlords’ broad constitutional challenge in 
Community Housing Improvement Project v. City of New York, but 
landlords have vowed to continue the legal fight, leaving the RSL in a state 
of limbo. 
This Note analyzes pressing arguments landlords have made in their 
challenges to the RSL and the district court’s reasons for rejecting them.  
Specifically, this Note addresses the claims that the amended RSL, on its face, 
effectuates a regulatory taking of property and constitutes a violation of due 
process.  This Note argues that the district court’s decision in Community 
Housing Improvement Project was correct and must be upheld in subsequent 
appeals.  However, this Note also addresses potential legal and policy issues 
raised by the 2019 RSL and suggests amendments aimed at better ensuring 
landlords a reasonable return on investment and more efficiently directing 
the RSL’s protections toward those who truly need them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New York City landlords and tenants’ rights advocates, who are 
diametrically opposed foes,1 have long battled vigorously for the ears of 
Albany lawmakers on the subject of rent regulation reform.2  In 2018, tenant 
 
 1. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The Room Where It Happens, on HAMILTON:  AN AMERICAN 
MUSICAL (Atl. Recording Corp. 2015). 
 2. See, e.g., Vivian Wang, Inside the Stealth Campaign for ‘Responsible Rent Reform,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/nyregion/rent-laws-
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advocates were emboldened when Democrats, “who promise[d] a 
progressive agenda,” took control of the New York State Senate for the first 
time since 2010.3  On June 14, 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo 
signed into law the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 20194 
(HSTPA), imposing “the strongest tenant protections in history.”5  Badly 
wounded, landlord associations have attempted to shift the battle to the 
courtroom.6 
On July 15, 2019, New York City landlord associations filed a complaint 
in the Eastern District of New York.7  The ensuing lawsuit, Community 
Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York,8 challenged the facial 
constitutionality of the HSTPA and the entirety of New York’s rent 
stabilization apparatus.9 
Separately, on November 14, 2019, a group of individual landlords filed a 
complaint challenging New York’s rent stabilization laws (RSL) in the 
Eastern District of New York,10 in 74 Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York.11  
Besides raising arguments similar to those made in Community Housing 
Improvement Program, 74 Pinehurst LLC discusses “as-applied 
 
landlords-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/PG9J-8X4L] (reporting that the real estate industry 
has channeled vast amounts of money and effort into creating a grass-roots-like campaign 
against progressive rent reform proposals); Vivian Wang & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Rent Laws:  
Dozens Arrested at State Capitol as Debate Escalates, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/nyregion/rent-laws-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/Z5V2-
CJX4] (describing a scene of hundreds of tenant activists descending on the New York State 
Capitol to pressure the New York State Legislature to pass stronger tenant protection rent 
laws). 
 3. See Jimmy Vielkind, Democrats Take Control of New York State Senate for First Time 
Since 2010, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-
take-control-of-new-york-state-senate-for-first-time-since-2010-1541592631 
[https://perma.cc/47WL-Q8EF].  Democratic Senate Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins declared 
that “[t]he voters of New York State have spoken . . . and we will finally give New Yorkers 
the progressive leadership they have been demanding.” Id. 
 4. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36. 
 5. See Press Release, N.Y. State Senate, Senate Passes Strongest Tenant Protections in 
State History (June 14, 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senate-
passes-strongest-tenant-protections-state-history [https://perma.cc/BG5Q-737L] (statement 
of Senate Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins, commending the New York State Senate 
for passing the HSTPA). 
 6. See Bobby Allyn, New York Landlords Call Rent Control Laws an ‘Illegal Taking’ in 
New Federal Lawsuit, NPR (July 17, 2019, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/ 
17/742875001/new-york-landlords-call-rent-control-laws-an-illegal-taking-in-new-federal-
lawsu [https://perma.cc/M74B-JNDC]; Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Landlords Strike Back, Suing to 
Dismantle Rent Regulation System, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/07/16/nyregion/ny-rent-regulation-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/S4NZ-EHMK]. 
 7. Complaint, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 
33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-04087), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 
2020). 
 8. 492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 
2020). 
 9. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 1. 
 10. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Just Compensation, 74 
Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York, No. 1:19-cv-6447, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217232 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Pinehurst Complaint]. 
 11. No. 19-cv-6447, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217232 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020). 
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constitutional challenges” based on the regulations’ effects on individual 
owners’ properties.12 
On September 30, 2020, U.S. District Judge Eric R. Komitee delivered an 
opinion in Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York,13 
addressing both lawsuits’ overlapping arguments.14  The court dismissed the 
Community Housing Improvement Program complaint (“the Community 
Housing Complaint”) in its entirety and dismissed all claims brought in the 
74 Pinehurst LLC Complaint (“the Pinehurst Complaint”), except 
“as-applied regulatory-takings claims brought by certain Pinehurst 
Plaintiffs.”15  The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate for a lower 
court to ignore precedent supporting the RSL’s constitutionality, “even if the 
2019 amendments go beyond prior regulations.”16  The plaintiff landlord 
associations quickly appealed the decision on October 2, 2020, believing that 
they would prevail at the appellate level.17 
The ongoing legal challenge presents an existential threat to the RSL, 
which regulates nearly one million New York City apartments housing 
approximately two million people.18  Nonetheless, as the district court’s 
dismissal suggests, landlords find themselves fighting against the current 
because “[t]he odds are against a party seeking to prevail on a facial 
challenge” to a rent regulation statute.19  In fact, all previous litigation 
 
 12. See Pinehurst Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. 
 13. 492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 
2020). 
 14. See id. at 38.  The moniker Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New 
York is used for both the district court decision and the individual lawsuit brought by 
Community Housing Improvement Program, which the district court decision addresses. 
 15. See id.  In the simplest terms, facial challenges argue that a measure is unconstitutional 
per se—or unconstitutional regardless of the factual circumstances involved in a particular 
plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994); Roger Pilon, Foreword, Facial v. As-Applied Challenges:  
Does It Matter?, 2008–2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. vii, ix (2009).  In contrast, as-applied 
challenges argue that “a statute, even though generally constitutional, operates 
unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.” Tex. 
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995); see also Dorf, 
supra, at 236 (contrasting as-applied and facial constitutional challenges). 
 16. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 38. 
 17. Georgia Kromrei, That Was Fast:  RSA and CHIP Appeal Rent Law Decision, REAL 
DEAL (Oct. 2, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com/2020/10/02/that-was-fast-rsa-and-chip-
appeal-rent-law-decision [https://perma.cc/6YMS-2QEA] (quoting a spokesperson for the 
landlord associations as claiming:  “we have always anticipated that we would be pursuing 
our claims on appeal and that the appeals process would lead to our eventual success”). 
 18. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Commissioner Ruthanne Visnauskas’s 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 3, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d 
33 (No. 1:19-cv-04087) [hereinafter Memo for the Defendant] (citing SELECTED INITIAL 
FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 11 (2018), 
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2017_ 
hvs_findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL54-WZU3]). 
 19. See Shelby D. Green et al., Landlord-Tenant Revolution Redux New York’s “Rad” 
Landlord-Tenant Law Revisions, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2020, at 34, 38; see also 
Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 6 (noting that the “Supreme Court has ultimately upheld rent 
regulations” and, although landlords hope that a conservative majority Supreme Court will 
reverse this trend, “reaching the Supreme Court could take years and chances are slim”). 
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challenging the constitutionality of the RSL has failed, both at the federal and 
state levels.20  Thus, this Note explores the question:  Has New York’s RSL 
finally pushed the boundaries too far?21 
Part I of this Note explains New York’s RSL and examines its history with 
a particular focus on the effects of the 2019 amendments enacted by the 
HSTPA.  It then introduces the lawsuits initiated by landlords in Community 
Housing Improvement Program to challenge the constitutionality of the 
RSL.22  Finally, Part I provides the relevant constitutional background for 
the alleged facial constitutional violations. 
Part II presents the legal arguments at the forefront of the Community 
Housing Improvement Program litigation and analyzes them through case 
law and scholarly policy opinions.  The primary legal controversies this Note 
addresses are whether the RSL as amended facially effectuates a regulatory 
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment or violates due process as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Part III argues that the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
broad facial regulatory takings and due process challenges in Community 
Housing Improvement Program was correct and should be upheld on appeal.  
The argument is grounded in precedent that has made clear that the issue of 
rent control should be fought in the legislature, not in the courtroom.  
However, it also acknowledges that the amended RSL pushes boundaries 
that, if abused, may have a detrimental effect on both renters and owners and 
could result in successful as-applied regulatory takings challenges.  
Therefore, this Note proposes that:  (1) regulated rent increases be tied to a 
predetermined formula to better ensure property owners a reasonable return 
on investment and incentivize necessary maintenance of the housing stock24 
and (2) the RSL include means testing as a tenant qualification for obtaining 
and maintaining occupancy in stabilized units to better achieve the legislative 
goal of providing affordable housing to New York’s low- and middle-income 
renters.25 
 
 20. See, e.g., Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x. 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub 
nom. Harmon v. Kimmel, 566 U.S. 962 (2012); Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 
F. Supp. 3d at 38 (“No precedent binding on this Court has ever found any provision of a 
rent-stabilization statute to violate the Constitution . . . .”); Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. 
Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 632 (N.Y. 1993). 
 21. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
 22. Unless otherwise specified, when this Note refers to Community Housing 
Improvement Program, it is referencing the September 30, 2020, decision rendered by the 
federal district court for the Eastern District of New York addressing both lawsuits challenging 
the RSL. 
 23. Other challenges brought by plaintiffs in Community Housing Improvement Program 
include facial physical takings claims, as-applied physical and regulatory takings claims, and 
a Contracts Clause claim. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 43–44, 
49–51, 52–54 (dismissing all of the aforementioned claims levied against the RSL with the 
exception of certain as-applied regulatory takings challenges). 
 24. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 25. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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I.  THE RSL:  A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY TAKES A RADICAL SHIFT  
The RSL is a longstanding but frequently changing New York City rent 
regulation regime that has often been the subject of bitter political and legal 
battles.26  Part I.A briefly describes the RSL’s scope, purpose, and 
components.  Part I.B discusses major events in the RSL’s history, including 
periods of increased and decreased regulatory power.  Part I.C narrows the 
focus to the RSL, as amended by the 2019 HSTPA, and details the 
amendments at issue in the constitutional challenge to the RSL.  Part I.D then 
briefly introduces the district court’s decision to dismiss the landlords’ legal 
challenge in Community Housing Improvement Program and the landlords’ 
plan to appeal.  Lastly, Part I.E provides necessary constitutional background 
for the relevant claims raised in Community Housing Improvement Program. 
A.  What Is the RSL? 
In 1974, the New York State Legislature determined that a housing 
emergency existed in areas of New York.27  It enacted the RSL as a necessary 
measure to “prevent exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents 
and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other 
disruptive practices.”28 
The RSL is comprised of a variety of laws and regulations that have been 
codified throughout New York’s legal system.29  Collectively, they regulate 
rent increases, entitle tenants to certain services, require landlords to renew 
tenant leases at the tenant’s will, and restrict the grounds for which a tenant 
can be evicted.30 
Generally, the RSL covers New York City buildings31 that contain six or 
more dwelling units that were built between February 1, 1947, and January 
1, 1974, and are not cooperatives (“co-ops”) or condominiums (“condos”).32  
 
 26. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8622 
(McKinney 2019).  In 2018, New York City determined that the housing emergency continues 
to exist, allowing the RSL to remain in effect. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-502. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-501 to 26-520; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621–8634; 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2520–2531; see also Memo for the Defendant, supra 
note 18, at 3 n.1 (providing a detailed description of where the RSL is codified). 
 30. Fact Sheet #1:  Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY. 
RENEWAL OFF. OF RENT ADMIN. 1 (2020), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/ 
2020/11/fact-sheet-01-09-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVH-TKPY].  Landlords can refuse to 
renew a tenant’s lease in a stabilized unit if that tenant is not using the unit as a primary 
residence. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.4(c). 
 31. The HSTPA expands the RSL’s coverage—which previously applied only to New 
York City and the counties of Nassau, Westchester, and Rockland—to New York City and 
“all counties within the state of New York,” but this Note is just concerned with New York 
City. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. G, § 3. 
 32. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504 (specifying the applicability of the RSL); Fact 
Sheet #1:  Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, supra note 30, at 1 (“Rent stabilization 
generally covers buildings built after 1947 and before 1974 . . . .”); Rent Stabilized Building 
Lists, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/ 
resources/rent-stabilized-building-lists [https://perma.cc/RRD9-PX8W] (last visited Sept. 17, 
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However, many apartments, despite fitting the above description, have 
become deregulated,33 through either luxury or high-income decontrol.34  
Additionally, newly constructed buildings that receive 421-a or J-51 tax 
exemptions may be stabilized even if the rent exceeds the luxury decontrol 
threshold.35 
According to the New York City Rent Guidelines Board (RGB), a city 
agency, the main tenets of the RSL are to “preserve the basic affordability of 
rental housing” and to promote “habitability and security of tenure” among 
regulated tenants.36  The issue of “fair returns for affected owners” is also an 
important consideration.37  The RGB is tasked with establishing annual 
guidelines for rent adjustments of stabilized units.38  These guidelines impose 
a percentage cap on allowable rent increases for leases of one and two 
years.39  In determining the allowable rent increases for New York City’s 
 
2021) (explaining that, in general, rent-stabilized buildings were built before 1974, contain six 
or more units, and are neither co-ops nor condos).  A condo is a private residence in a multiunit 
building that includes ownership of commonly used property. See Lester Davis, Condo vs. 
Co-Op:  Know the Differences Before Buying One, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/condo-vs-co-op-know-the-differences-before-
buying-one/2018/01/30/804e7bd6-faf5-11e7-ad8c-ecbb62019393_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SNH-VUNJ] (“Co-ops are collectively owned and managed by their 
residents, who own shares in a nonprofit corporation.”).  For more information on the RSL as 
it applies to condo and co-op conversions, see Co-ops & Condos FAQ, N.Y.C. RENT 
GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/faqs/co-ops-condos 
[https://perma.cc/A4AZ-LMHG] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 33. “Deregulation occurs by action of the owner when an apartment under either rent 
control or rent stabilization legally meets the criteria for leaving regulation.  When an 
apartment is deregulated, the rent may be set at ‘market rate.’” Glossary of Rent Regulation 
Terms, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/ 
resources/glossary-of-rent-regulation-terms/ [https://perma.cc/F6K4-DCBF] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021). 
 34. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING 
STOCK IN NYC IN 2019, at 7–8 (2020), https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/2020-Changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRR-FZ29] (finding that 
168,170 units were deregulated due to “High-Rent Vacancy Deregulation” and 6615 units 
were deregulated due to “High-Rent High-Income Deregulation”).  This Note, following the 
terminology used by the parties to Community Housing Improvement Program, refers to 
“high-rent vacancy deregulation” as “luxury decontrol” and “high-rent high-income 
deregulation” as “high income decontrol.” See Complaint, supra note 7, at 19; Memo for the 
Defendant, supra note 18, at 9.  For more information on luxury and high-income decontrol, 
see infra Parts I.B.3, I.C.2. 
 35. See Rent Stabilized Building Lists, supra note 32 (“Buildings which are listed as 
‘421.a’ or ‘j-51’ are stabilized because they took advantage of the 421-a or J-51 tax exemption 
program.  These buildings remain rent-stabilized for the length of the tax exemption, and 
thereafter may be deregulated if the buildings were not stabilized prior to the participation in 
the tax exemption program.”). 
 36. See TIMOTHY L. COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT 
GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 55 (rev. ed. 2020), 
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/intro2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PT7B-R3G5]. 
 37. See id. at 55–56. 
 38. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b). 
 39. See id.; COLLINS, supra note 36, at 82.  Under certain conditions, regulated rent may 
exceed RGB-sanctioned increases. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6), (c)(13) 
(providing exceptions where a landlord undertakes individual apartment improvements and 
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stabilized apartments, the RGB considers a multitude of factors, including 
economic conditions of the rental real estate industry, cost of living statistics, 
and any other relevant data made available to the RGB.40 
The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal 
(DHCR) is the executive agency responsible for overseeing nearly all aspects 
of the state’s low- and moderate-income affordable housing.41  The DHCR 
is charged with administering the RSL.42  The DHCR’s responsibilities 
include:  promulgating regulations governing the RSL, codified as the Rent 
Stabilization Code (“the Code”); administering various filings and 
registrations; and adjudicating claims brought by landlords and tenants 
pursuant to the Code.43 
B.  A Brief History of the RSL 
Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 194244 (EPCA).  The ECPA instituted a 
nationwide price regulation system affecting various industries, including 
housing, to “prevent wartime profiteering.”45  In 1947, the EPCA expired 
and was replaced by the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.46  The new law kept 
rent control in place for all buildings built before February 1, 1947, but 
removed control for new construction.47  The federal government used rent 
control measures to set ceilings on rent that landlords may charge tenants. 
On July 1, 1953, Congress removed all federal rent control mechanisms, 
while allowing states to implement their own rent control laws.48  By 1961, 
New York City was the only location in the United States that still maintained 
 
major capital improvements).  For an explanation of individual apartment improvements and 
major capital improvements rent regulation provisions, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 40. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b); see also COLLINS, supra note 36, at 82–104 
(providing a more in-depth explanation of the duties of the RGB and the factors used to 
determine the annual rent guideline increases). 
 41. See Division of Housing and Community Renewal, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY. 
RENEWAL, https://hcr.ny.gov/division-housing-and-community-renewal [https://perma.cc/ 
6XB8-7V6L] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 42. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 74–75. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947). 
 45. Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine):  
Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2004); see also N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL 
OFF. OF RENT ADMIN., RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS:  AN OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK 
STATE’S RENT REGULATED HOUSING 1993, at 3 (1993) [hereinafter RENT REGULATION AFTER 
50 YEARS], http://www.tenant.net/Oversight/50yrRentReg/50yr.html [https://perma.cc/ 
TDY7-CRD9]. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 80-129, 61 Stat. 193 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1744). 
 47. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1134. 
 48. See id. at 1134–35. 
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a rent control system.49  Throughout the 1960s, New York City implemented 
measures that gradually eroded its rent control system.50 
1.  The Creation of the RSL 
By 1969, the country was experiencing a severe economic downturn due 
to rising inflation caused by the Vietnam War.51  In New York City, housing 
production slumped, and the vacancy rate “fell drastically” from 3.2 percent 
in 1965 to 1.23 percent in 1968.52 
New York City enacted the Rent Stabilization Law of 196953 in response 
to rapidly rising rents in unregulated apartments and a shortage of affordable 
housing.54  The law regulated buildings with six or more units constructed 
after February 1, 1947.55  Unlike rent control, the Rent Stabilization Law of 
1969 regulated rent through leases rather than statutes.56  It obligated 
landlords of stabilized units to renew leases to their tenants and provided that 
the RGB set allowable rent increases for the following year.57 
2.  Deregulation and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 
In 1971, the New York State Legislature “passed several laws designed to 
deregulate” all rent-regulated housing.58  This included vacancy decontrol 
measures, which deregulated rent controlled and stabilized units that were 
voluntarily vacated after July 1, 1971.59  The Urstadt Law60 further 
undermined New York City’s rent regulation regime by prohibiting any 
 
 49. Id. at 1135.  The number of units subject to rent control in New York State dropped 
from 2.5 million in 1950 to 1.8 million in 1961. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, 
supra note 45, at 3–4.  In New York, rent control is a rent regulation system which is entirely 
separate from the later-enacted RSL and generally applies to tenants of buildings built before 
February 1, 1947, where the tenant has continuously occupied the unit prior to July 1, 1971. 
See Rent Control FAQ, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/faqs/rent-control/#difference 
[https://perma.cc/79CU-H38S] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  Rent control is also administered 
by the DHCR and restricts a landlord’s ability to evict tenants and raise rents. See Fact Sheet 
#1:  Rent Stabilization and Rent Control, supra note 30, at 2–3.  New York’s rent control 
system is not at issue in this Note. 
 50. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7.  Presently, there are 
only approximately 22,000 rent-controlled apartments remaining. See Rent Control FAQ, 
supra note 49. 
 51. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7. 
 52. See id. 
 53. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-503. 
 54. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 26–27. 
 55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 56. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1136. 
 57. See supra Part I.A (explaining the RSL). 
 58. RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7; see also 1971 N.Y. Laws 
371. 
 59. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 371; RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7. 
 60. 1971 N.Y. Laws 372.  This law is commonly referred to as the “Urstadt Law” after 
the then-State Housing Commissioner Charles Urstadt. See McPherson, supra note 45, at 1126 
n.9; RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7. 
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municipality from passing rent regulations that were stronger than state 
regulations.61 
Between 1971 and 1973, rapid deregulation of controlled and stabilized 
apartments, coupled with soaring inflation rates, resulted in huge rent 
increases.62  Responding to this housing crisis, Governor Nelson Rockefeller 
assembled a committee led by Assemblyman Andrew Stein to investigate and 
evaluate the impact of vacancy decontrol.63  The committee issued a scathing 
rebuke (“the Stein Report”) to the state’s vacancy decontrol measures, 
finding that they had “[n]o beneficial side effects,” resulted in large rent 
increases, inflicted tenant hardship, and did not lead to major capital 
investments or new construction.64  Ultimately, the Stein Report 
recommended that “vacancy decontrol should be repealed.”65 
In June 1974, the New York legislature passed the Emergency Tenant 
Protection Act of 197466 (ETPA).  The ETPA allowed local governments to 
declare a housing emergency and implement rent regulation where the 
vacancy rate was lower than 5 percent.67  New York City immediately 
declared a housing emergency68 and re-regulated units that had been 
deregulated by vacancy decontrol.69 
3.  Deregulation Returns 
In 1993, New York enacted the Rent Regulation Reform Act,70 which 
introduced deregulation measures to the RSL.71  Luxury decontrol was one 
such measure.  It allowed owners to “permanently deregulate apartments that 
had a legal regulated monthly rent of $2,000 or higher when they became 
vacant.”72  The $2000 threshold was raised to $2500 in 201173 and raised 
again to $2700 in 2015.74  The threshold was to be adjusted each subsequent 
 
 61. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 372; McPherson, supra note 45, at 1137–38. 
 62. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7 (noting that from July 
1971 through December 1973, approximately 300,000 rent-controlled units and 88,000 
rent-stabilized apartments were deregulated). 
 63. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 28–29. 
 64. TEMP. STATE COMM’N ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECON., 1974 STEIN REPORT ON 
VACANCY DECONTROL 3–4, 21 (1974) (finding that, on average, vacancy decontrol led to a 
52-percent rent increase in formerly rent-controlled apartments and a 19-percent increase in 
rent-stabilized apartments in New York City). 
 65. Id. at 21. 
 66. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621–8634 (McKinney 2019). 
 67. See id. § 8623. 
 68. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501. 
 69. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 4–7.  The Rent Stabilization 
Law of 1969 also stabilized buildings constructed between March 11, 1969, and December 
31, 1973. See id. 
 70. 1993 N.Y. Laws 253. 
 71. See Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8; McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140. 
 72. Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8 (citing 1993 N.Y. Laws 253); see 
McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140 (explaining luxury decontrol). 
 73. See Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 8 (citing 2011 N.Y. Laws 97). 
 74. See id. (citing 2015 N.Y. Laws 20). 
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year by the same rate as the RGB one-year rent renewal increase 
percentage.75 
Another measure—high-income decontrol—permitted “owners to 
permanently deregulate occupied apartments with rents of $2,000 or more 
and tenants whose household annual income exceeded $250,000 in each of 
the prior two years.”76  The income requirement was reduced to $175,000 in 
1997,77 and then raised to $200,000 alongside an increase in the rental 
threshold to $2500 in 2011.78 
Incredibly contentious debate over the RSL in the state legislature 
preceded the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997,79 which reduced the 
income requirement for high-income decontrol, allowed owners to increase 
rent up to 20 percent upon vacancy of the unit (known as a “vacancy bonus”), 
restricted tenant succession rights, and imposed several other 
landlord-friendly measures that allowed rents to increase quickly.80 
The Rent Act of 201181 and the Rent Act of 201582 began a moderate shift 
away from the statutory gains previously won by landlord advocates.83  
Besides the aforementioned adjustments to luxury and high-income 
decontrol, amendments to the RSL included limits on the allowable 
frequency and percentage of vacancy increases and small reforms to major 
capital improvements (MCIs) and individualized apartment improvements 
(IAIs).84  With the 2015 RSL regime set to expire in four years, the stage was 
set for a renewed fight in 2019.85 
C.  The Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 
The HSTPA sought to protect affordable housing primarily by eliminating 
avenues for landlords to remove their units from RSL regulation and by 
curtailing landlords’ ability to increase rents above the RGB’s allowable rent 
 
 75. See id. (citing 2015 N.Y. Laws 20). 
 76. Id. (citing 1993 N.Y. Laws 253) (explaining high-income decontrol). 
 77. See id. (citing 1997 N.Y. Laws 116). 
 78. See id. (citing 2011 N.Y. Laws 97). 
 79. 1997 N.Y. Laws 116; see McPherson, supra note 45, at 1140–41 (“Senator Bruno 
called for the complete abolition of rent regulation in New York State.  Senator Bruno’s 
statement ‘transformed an insider’s game—fought with campaign contributions, backroom 
lobbying and arcane legislative maneuvers—into a media spectacle, a holy war.’” (quoting 
James Dao & Richard Pérez-Peña, Rent War Redux:  As Dust Settles, A Tortuous Inside Story 
Emerges, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/29/nyregion/rent-
war-redux-as-dust-settles-a-tortuous-inside-story-emerges.html [https://perma.cc/G429-
WVFM])); see also Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake:  George Pataki, Market Ideology, and 
the Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339, 339–40, 
351–54 (2004) (describing the bitter political fight over rent regulations in New York City 
leading up to the 1997 amendments to New York’s RSL). 
 80. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 34–36. 
 81. 2011 N.Y. Laws 97. 
 82. 2015 N.Y. Laws 20. 
 83. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 36–37. 
 84. See id.; 2011 N.Y. Laws 97; 2015 N.Y. Laws 20.  For an explanation of MCI and IAI 
rent regulation provisions, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 85. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 37. 
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increases.  In doing so, the 2019 amendments to the RSL radically shifted the 
law in favor of tenant advocates. 
1.  The Buildup to Change 
In 2018, the New York City Council paved the way for changes to the RSL 
regime, which was set to expire in June 2019,86 by reaffirming the existence 
of an ongoing housing crisis in New York City.87  Before the vote, New York 
City Council Speaker Corey Johnson voiced his support for extending the 
emergency finding and aligned himself with tenant advocates committed to 
strengthening the RSL to “protect” affordable housing.88 
Advocates of stronger rent stabilization decried the RSL provisions that 
undermined the laws’ effectiveness, encouraged tenant harassment, and 
incubated rampant fraud.89  As of 2019, nearly 175,000 stabilized units had 
been lost to luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions in the RSL.90  
Advocates zealously pushed for strong reforms to maintain affordable 
housing.91  Conversely, landlord associations warned that proposed changes 
to the RSL were untenable and would result in a steep decline in the quality 
of the city’s housing stock.92 
On June 14, 2019, the newly Democrat-controlled state legislature 
followed through on its progressive platform and enacted “the strongest 
tenant protections in history.”93  Tenant advocates celebrated the HSTPA as 
“a much-needed adjustment in the balance of the fortunes of those needing 
accessible housing,” while property owners and investors regarded the law 
as “concernedly ‘radical’” and an infringement on property rights.94 
 
 86. See 2015 N.Y. Laws 20, pt. A, § 1. 
 87. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-502. 
 88. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES OF THE CITY COUNCIL STATED 
MEETING 44 (Mar. 22, 2018) (transcribing New York City Council Speaker Corey Johnson’s 
proclamation that “the easiest way to protect affordable housing is to preserve the affordable 
housing that we have and to strengthen the rent laws”). 
 89. See OKSANA MIRONOVA & JEFF JONES, CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES 1–10 (2019), 
https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/rent_loopholes_ 
FINAL_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ78-PRFQ] (demonstrating how the then-current 
RSL could be manipulated, legally and illegally, to hike rents and rapidly deregulate 
apartments); Justin R. La Mort, The Theft of Affordable Housing:  How Rent-Stabilized 
Apartments Are Disappearing from Fraudulent Individual Apartment Improvements and What 
Can Be Done to Save Them, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 360–64 (2016) (arguing 
that the then-current RSL’s individual apartment improvement provision was facilitating fraud 
and leading to rampant deregulation of stabilized units). 
 90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., MIRONOVA & JONES, supra note 89, at 10; Wang & Ferré-Sadurní, supra 
note 2 (reporting on tenants zealously protesting at the New York State Capitol in an attempt 
to spur action for stronger rent reform). 
 92. See Testimony of the Real Estate Board of New York Before the Rent Guidelines Board 
Regarding Lease Renewal Guidelines for 2019, REAL EST. BD. OF N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.rebny.com/content/rebny/en/newsroom/testimony/2019_Testimony/Rent-
Guidelines-Board_Lease-Renewal-Guidelines-2019.html [https://perma.cc/E475-XDLA]. 
 93. Press Release, supra note 5. 
 94. Green et al., supra note 19, at 34. 
2021] STRONGER THAN EVER 843 
2.  The New Amendments to the RSL 
Several HSTPA provisions spurred New York City landlords to pursue 
legal action against the entire RSL regime.95  First, the HSTPA eliminated 
luxury and high-income decontrol.96  Owners could no longer deregulate a 
unit when it reached a certain rent threshold, regardless of the tenant’s 
income.97  Tenants praised the move for removing measures that led over 
170,000 stabilized units to be eliminated and incentivized landlords to 
engineer rent hikes and harass tenants.98  Landlords viewed the move as 
inconsistent with the goal of providing affordable housing to vulnerable 
renters because repealing luxury and high-income decontrol benefits wealthy 
tenants living in stabilized apartments.99 
Second, the HSTPA eliminated vacancy and longevity increases.100  The 
HSTPA prohibits the RGB from creating any statutory rent increases for 
vacancies and prolonged tenant occupancy.101  Previously, landlords could 
increase a unit’s rent by 20 percent during vacancies and apply an additional 
0.6 percent per year “longevity bonus” on rent for units that have not been 
vacant for eight or more years.102  Tenants supported the change as 
eliminating a financial incentive to harass and evict tenants.103  Landlords 
agreed that it removed the incentive to evict because they could no longer 
justify the cost of expensive eviction proceedings, which would lead to more 
problematic tenants and fewer vacancies.104 
Third, the HSTPA capped and further restricted rent increases for IAIs105 
and MCIs.106  The RSL’s IAI provision allows landlords to pass on the cost 
of individual apartment improvements to the tenant.107  Before the 2019 
amendments, “[o]wners could increase the monthly rent by 1/40th of the cost 
of the improvement in buildings with 35 or fewer apartments and 1/60th in 
buildings with 36 or more apartments.”108  The HSTPA reduced allowable 
 
 95. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 1–2.  For a list of HSTPA provisions at issue in the 
lawsuit, see id. at 25–28. 
 96. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. D, § 5 (repealing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-504.2, 26-
504.3). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Gerald Lebovits et al., New York’s Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act 
of 2019:  What Lawyers Must Know, 29 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 75, 95 (2020). 
 99. See id. at 96 (“[A]bolishing luxury deregulation permits the possibility of a tenant with 
$1M annual income living in a $10,000/month rent-stabilized apartment”). 
 100. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. C, § 1 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(j)). 
 101. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(j). 
 102. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 95. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. K, §§ 1, 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13)).  
The abbreviation “IAI” stands for “individual apartment improvements.” See supra note 84 
and accompanying text. 
 106. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. K, §§ 4, 11 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6)).  
The abbreviation “MCI” stands for “major capital improvements.” See supra note 84 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13). 
 108. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99. 
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rent increases to 1/168th (for buildings with thirty-five or fewer units) and 
1/180th (for buildings with thirty-six or more units) of the cost of the 
improvement.109  Further, the HSTPA permits “no more than three separate 
IAIs, with a total aggregate cost of no more than $15,000.00, within a 15-year 
period.”110  IAIs were formerly uncapped.111  Tenants supported the change, 
arguing that landlords exploited the former IAI provisions to increase rent 
and deregulate apartments through unnecessary cosmetic improvements and 
fraud.112  Landlords warned that the change removed incentives for landlords 
to maintain their properties and would lead to dilapidated buildings and 
warehousing of vacant units.113 
The RSL’s MCI provision allows landlords to pass on the costs of major 
building improvements to their tenants.114  Before, owners could recoup their 
MCI costs over an eight-year amortization period (for buildings with 
thirty-five or fewer units) or a nine-year amortization period (for buildings 
with thirty-six or more units), with annual rent increases capped at 6 
percent.115  The HSTPA increased the amortization period to twelve and 
twelve-and-a-half years, respectively, and caps the annual rent increase at 2 
percent.116  As with IAIs, landlords complain that the RSL’s regulated 
method for recovering MCI costs is insufficient.117  The HSTPA also made 
the rent increases associated with IAIs and MCIs temporary and required 
their removal from the rent after thirty years.118 
Fourth, the HSTPA further limited landlords’ ability to convert regulated 
rental units to co-op or condo ownership.119  The RSL allows owners to 
remove apartments from regulation through condo and co-op conversion.120  
 
 109. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(13). 
 110. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 100. 
 111. See id. at 99. 
 112. See id. at 100.  Tenant advocates argue that the RSL’s IAI regime incentivizes fraud 
due to inadequate oversight of reported IAI expenses coupled with the potential for sizeable 
rent increases. Id.; see also La Mort, supra note 89, at 361–62. 
 113. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 101; Josh Barbanel, New York Landlords Slow 
Apartment Upgrades, Blame New Rent Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-landlords-slow-apartment-upgrades-blame-new-
rent-law-11576756800 [https://perma.cc/TJ72-SA7Q].  Warehousing occurs when a landlord 
decides not to relet a vacant apartment. See Alanna Schubach, Why Do Some NYC Landlords 
Leave Apartments Empty?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Aug. 30, 2017, 11:39 AM), 
https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/why-landlords-leave-apartments-empty 
[https://perma.cc/B9R3-GS3D].  Landlords have threatened to leave vacant apartments empty 
because the amended IAI provision prevents them from recovering the cost of repairs required 
to re-rent them. See Austin Havens-Bowen, New Bill Aims to Fine Landlords Who Warehouse 
Rent-Stabilized Apartments, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Mar. 13, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/new-bill-to-fine-landlords-who-warehouse-rent-
stabilized-apartments-nyc [https://perma.cc/DQG9-LJLX]. 
 114. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6).  Common examples of MCIs include the 
installation of a new boiler or plumbing system. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99. 
 115. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 99. 
 116. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6). 
 117. Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 101. 
 118. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(6), (c)(13). 
 119. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. N, § 1 (amending N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee). 
 120. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee. 
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However, it limits the availability of this conversion process by eliminating 
eviction plan conversions and raising the requirement that owners obtain 
purchase agreements from 15 percent of tenants to 51 percent of tenants in 
noneviction conversion plans.121  Tenants praised these changes as removing 
a tool for landlords to convert affordable housing into apartments that most 
New Yorkers cannot afford.122  Landlords believed that raising the 
conversion threshold to 51 percent in order to convert their building to a 
co-op or condo effectively transfers the decision to tenants, which improperly 
violates their right to dispose of property and reduces the building’s value.123 
Fifth, the HSTPA eliminated preferential rent increases.124  Under the 
RSL, landlords may charge a tenant less than the legal rent; this is known as 
preferential rent.125  Before the 2019 amendments, landlords could reserve 
the right to charge the legal rent upon the expiration of a lease charging the 
preferential rent.126  The HSTPA made preferential rent permanent while the 
tenant remains in the apartment and only allows owners to charge the legal 
rent upon vacancy.127  Tenants supported the change because it prevents 
landlords from abruptly and significantly raising renewal rents, which can 
price current tenants out.128  Landlords characterized the change as unfair 
and harmful to owners’ expected return on investment.129 
Sixth, the HSTPA reduced the personal use exemption.130  The RSL 
provides landlords with the means to recover a rented apartment for personal 
use under certain circumstances.131  Before the 2019 amendments, owners 
could recover a rented unit upon a showing that either they or their immediate 
family member sought to occupy the apartment for personal use as a primary 
residence.132  The HSTPA constricted the personal use exemption by limiting 
recovery to one unit per building for use as a primary residence and only 
 
 121. See id. § 352-eeee(1)(c); Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 97.  Under eviction plan 
conversions, stabilized renters who do not purchase their units pursuant to the conversion plan 
can be evicted. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(c).  Under noneviction plan 
conversions, stabilized renters who do not purchase their units may continue to occupy their 
apartments indefinitely as rent-stabilized tenants. See Co-ops & Condos FAQ, supra note 32. 
 122. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 97. 
 123. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 124. 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. E, § 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(14)). 
 125. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98.  Generally, landlords will give a preferential 
rent when they cannot find a tenant willing to lease at the legal rent. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(14); Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98 (“All 
rent increases for lease renewals must be based on the preferential rent.”). 
 128. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 98; MIRONOVA & JONES, supra note 89, at 4–5 
(using real examples to demonstrate how under the previous RSL regime, preferential rent 
could be used in conjunction with other RSL provisions to push out tenants and quickly 
deregulate units through luxury decontrol). 
 129. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 102–03. 
 130. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. I, § 2 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b)). 
 131. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b). 
 132. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. I, § 2; Complaint, supra note 7, at 79.  Courts interpreted 
the personal use exemption to require a showing of good faith by the landlord wishing to 
recover a regulated unit. See, e.g., Pennella v. Joy, 433 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (App. Div. 1980) 
(rejecting landlord’s attempt to recover a regulated unit for personal use because the landlord’s 
request lacked “good faith”). 
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upon a showing of “immediate and compelling necessity.”133  Landlords 
decried the change as a clear restriction on their right to possess and use their 
private property.134 
Seventh, the HSTPA extended the RSL’s post-breach relief provisions.135  
In some cases, the RSL protects tenants even after a landlord has evicted a 
tenant through judicial proceedings.136  Before the 2019 amendments, if the 
landlord won an eviction proceeding against a holdover tenant,137 the tenant 
had ten days to cure the breach, and the court could stay the eviction warrant 
for up to six months.138  The HSTPA extended the cure period for holdover 
breaches to thirty days and allowed judges to stay an eviction warrant for up 
to one year for both holdover and nonpayment evictions.139  Judges may 
grant stays of eviction after determining that eviction would cause the tenant 
or the tenant’s family “extreme hardship.”140  Landlords contended that they 
should not be responsible for alleviating the hardship of particular tenants 
and that the post-breach relief provisions “contribute[] to the confiscatory 
and irrational nature” of the RSL.141 
Lastly, the HSTPA permanently codified the RSL by eliminating the 
sunset provision.142  The sunset provision has been a staple of all previous 
versions of the RSL.143  Now, the HSTPA will remain the governing law 
until there is “political consensus [for amending the RSL] among the [New 
York State] Senate, Assembly, and Governor.”144 
 
 133. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-511(c)(9)(b). 
 134. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 79–80. 
 135. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. M, § 21 (amending N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753 
(Consol. 2020)). 
 136. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753 (Consol. 2020). 
 137. A holdover tenant is a tenant who is being evicted for reasons other than the 
nonpayment of rent. See THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & THE CIV. CT. OF N.Y, 
A TENANT’S GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 5 (2006) [hereinafter A TENANT’S 
GUIDE TO HOUSING COURT], https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/tenantsguide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JF93-M45N]. 
 138. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 117. 
 139. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753(1).  Nonpayment evictions are caused by a 
tenant’s failure to pay rent. See A TENANT’S GUIDE TO HOUSING COURT, supra note 137, at 2.  
Holdover evictions are evictions for reasons other than nonpayment of the rent. See id. at 5. 
 140. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 753(1), (4).  Judges may consider factors such as 
health, a child’s enrollment in school, and “other extenuating life circumstances affecting the 
ability of the [tenant] or the [tenant’s] family to relocate and maintain quality of life.” Id. 
§ 753(1). 
 141. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ and 
Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 
492 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-04087), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d 
Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Memo for the Plaintiff]. 
 142. See 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, pt. A.  The sunset provision is “a date by which the 
Legislature must renew the rent laws to prevent their expiration.” Lebovits et al., supra note 
98, at 93. 
 143. See Lebovits et al., supra note 98, at 93. 
 144. Id.  However, the City Council will still have to determine that a housing emergency 
exists every three years for the RSL to remain in effect. Id. at 94. 
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D.  Landlords Turn to the Courts 
On June 15, 2019, New York City real estate associations representing 
landlord interests filed a lawsuit “intended to dismantle the entire 
rent-regulation system, which dictates the rents of about 2.4 million 
tenants.”145  The plaintiffs insisted that the RSL has always been 
unconstitutional but the HSTPA amendments leave “no doubt that the RSL’s 
irrationality and arbitrariness, and its web of restrictions override core rights 
of property owners and impose unconstitutional burdens on property 
owners.”146  They claim that the RSL on its face violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, as both a physical and regulatory 
uncompensated taking, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.147 
On November 14, 2019, a group of individual landlords (“the Pinehurst 
Plaintiffs”) separately filed a legal challenge to the RSL in federal court.148  
Besides the claims already noted above, the lawsuit made as-applied physical 
and regulatory takings claims and asserted that the RSL violates the Contracts 
Clause.149 
On September 30, 2020, the district court dismissed all the facial 
challenges to the RSL raised by both plaintiff groups.150  Anticipating this 
result at the district court level, landlords quickly appealed the decision.151  
Landlord interest groups anticipate that a conservative, 
property-rights-friendly U.S. Supreme Court will grant certiorari.152 
 
 145. See Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 6.  The plaintiffs listed in the complaint include two 
New York real estate trade associations, the Rent Stabilization Association of N.Y.C. (RSA) 
and the Community Housing Improvement Program (CHIP), and individual landlords of 
rent-stabilized buildings. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 9–11.  The defendants are the City 
of New York, the RGB, and individual members of the DHCR and RGB. See id. at 11–12. 
 146. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 147. See id. at 1; see also Kathryn Brenzel, What You Need to Know About Landlords’ 
Challenge to New York’s Rent Law, REAL DEAL (July 16, 2019, 5:55 PM), 
https://therealdeal.com/2019/07/16/what-you-need-to-know-about-landlords-challenge-to-
new-yorks-rent-law/ [https://perma.cc/96Z6-VSAW]. 
 148. See Pinehurst Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. 
 149. See id. at 2–4.  This Note primarily focuses on the landlords’ facial regulatory takings 
and due process challenges to the RSL’s constitutionality, rather than the facial physical 
takings, as-applied takings, and Contract Clause challenges. 
 150. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 38 
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).  The court refused to 
dismiss the Pinehurst Plaintiff’s as-applied challenges “at this stage.” Id. 
 151. See Kromrei, supra note 17. 
 152. See Ryan Deffenbaugh, Landlords Take Rent-Control Fight to Federal Court, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (July 16, 2019, 9:35 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-
estate/landlords-take-rent-control-fight-federal-court [https://perma.cc/KV86-JUB3] (noting 
that the Supreme Court is more conservative than it was in 2012, when it refused to hear 
Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x. 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Harmon v. 
Kimmel, 566 U.S. 962 (2012), a similar case challenging the RSL); see also Real Deal, Inside 
Real Estate’s Legal Challenge to the Rent Law, YOUTUBE (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKxOuCtGJD0 [https://perma.cc/GN6B-XA6K] 
(interviewing landlord plaintiffs’ attorney, Andrew Pincus, who anticipates that the case will 
need to be heard by all three levels of the federal judiciary to be resolved).  Since the lawsuit 
began, the Supreme Court has grown more conservative with the appointment of Justice 
848 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
E.  Constitutional Amendments at Issue in Community Housing 
Improvement Program 
In Community Housing Improvement Program, landlords adamantly 
challenged the constitutionality of the RSL.153  This Note examines the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the RSL violates the Fifth Amendment as an 
uncompensated regulatory taking of private property, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a violation of due process.154 
1.  Fifth Amendment Regulatory Takings 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “private property [shall not] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”155  Traditionally, the 
government violates this right by authorizing a “physical occupation of 
property (or actually tak[ing] title).”156  Where the government “requires the 
landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land,” it can be said 
that the government has physically taken the land.157 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,158 the Supreme Court determined that 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause also required the government to 
compensate citizens whose property was subjected to such onerous 
regulation that it was effectively taken from them.159  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. explained, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”160  Such a taking 
is known as a regulatory taking. To determine if a legislative measure 
amounts to a regulatory taking, one must first identify the line of demarcation 
dividing the valid use of a state’s power161 from invalid regulations that 
“forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”162 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,163 the Court failed 
to deliver this clear line; instead, it developed an “ad hoc, factual inquir[y]” 
for evaluating regulatory takings claims.164  The framework includes analysis 
 
Barrett. See Kathryn Brenzel, Supreme Court Shift Could Favor Rent Law Challengers, REAL 
DEAL (Oct. 28, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2020/10/28/supreme-court-shift-
could-favor-rent-law-challengers [https://perma.cc/BJ92-UXNV]. 
 153. See generally Complaint, supra note 7. 
 154. See id. at 2–5, 6–9. 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 156. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992). 
 157. Id. at 527.  In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court 
concluded that a law compelling owners of residential buildings to allow cable companies to 
install and attach cable boxes to their buildings to provide tenants with access to cable 
television was an unconstitutional taking, without regard to the public interest served by the 
regulation or the size of the area actually being occupied. 458 U.S. 419, 426, 436–37 (1982). 
 158. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 159. See id. at 415; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005). 
 160. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 161. See id. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”). 
 162. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 163. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 164. Id. at 124. 
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of the “character of the governmental action,” the “economic impact” on the 
regulated property’s value, and the interference with owners’ reasonable 
investment-backed expectations (“the Penn Central test”).165  In Penn 
Central, the Court found that a regulation designating Grand Central as a 
state landmark and prohibiting the owners from using the property in ways 
that too greatly diminished its historical and aesthetic value was not a 
regulatory taking on its face.166  The owners retained the right to use and 
possess Grand Central, and the regulation neither too greatly diminished the 
overall economic value of the property nor impeded investment-backed 
expectations.167 
2.  Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”168  The 
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to protect individuals against both 
procedural169 and, more controversially, substantive170 violations of their 
rights.171  Generally, when economic and land use regulations that do not 
disturb fundamental rights are challenged on due process grounds, such 
regulations are subject only to rational basis review, which assesses whether 
the measures are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.172 
In assessing a due process challenge to a San Jose rent control ordinance 
in Pennell v. City of San Jose,173 the Court stated that “[p]rice control is 
‘unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant 
 
 165. Id.  In the past, the Court evaluated whether the regulation “substantially advance[d] 
legitimate state interests.” See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).  In 2005, 
the Court explicitly abandoned this test as part of its takings analysis. See Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
 166. 438 U.S. at 108–10, 135–38. 
 167. See id. at 130–31. 
 168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
 169. “‘Procedural due process’ concerns the procedures that the government must follow 
before it deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.” Nathan S. Chapman & Kenji 
Yoshino, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-
xiv/clauses/701 [https://perma.cc/8YXQ-ZFHL] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 170. Substantive due process concerns the idea that some rights are too important to be 
infringed by the government, regardless of the process given. See id. 
 171. See id.; see also Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 253, 257–60 (2016) (providing both criticism of substantive due process by 
prominent legal scholars and a defense of the concept). 
 172. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82–83 
(1978); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 
486–87 (2d Cir. 1995); Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and The Takings Clause, 
1989 WIS. L. REV. 925, 945–46.  For a brief summary of the development of the Supreme 
Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence, see The Rise and Fall of Economic 
Substantive Due Process, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/the-rise-and-fall-
of-economic-substantive-due-process-overview [https://perma.cc/PXJ9-J5TA] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021). 
 173. 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
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to the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . . .’”174  The case demonstrates 
that due process challenges to rent regulations generally face a high 
burden.175 
The next part discusses the regulatory takings and due process challenges 
levied against the RSL by the plaintiff landlords and the district court’s 
reasoning for dismissing the claims in Community Housing Improvement 
Program.  These arguments are further examined and supported through 
works of other scholars and public figures. 
II.  EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RSL 
Although unsuccessful at the district court level,176 landlords have vowed 
to continue the fight to cut the RSL down at its roots.177  This part examines 
the arguments offered by the landlords and the court’s reasoning for dismissal 
in Community Housing Improvement Program as it pertains to (1) the facial 
regulatory takings claim and (2) the due process claim. 
A.  Does the RSL Effect a Regulatory Taking? 
Even in the heyday of economic substantive due process,178 Justice 
Holmes proclaimed that “[h]ousing is a necessary of life” and “a public 
exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a 
certain extent without compensation.”179  He further explained, however, that 
“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking.”180 
The Penn Central test governs whether the RSL goes “too far.”181  It 
requires evaluating:  (1) the character of the RSL’s regulation, (2) its 
economic effect on the value of regulated property, and (3) its interference 
with investment-backed expectations.182  Additionally, the Court has 
described unconstitutional takings as government action that “forc[es] some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.”183 
 
 174. See id. at 11 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769–70 (1968)). 
 175. See id. at 11–13. 
 176. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 38 
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 177. See Kromrei, supra note 17. 
 178. See The Rise and Fall of Economic Substantive Due Process, supra note 172 
(discussing the history of the Court’s changing attitude toward states’ police power to interfere 
with individuals’ economic rights and the apparent incorporation of laissez-faire economics 
into the Court’s due process jurisprudence during the late 1800s and early 1900s). 
 179. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921). 
 180. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 181. See supra Part I.E.1 (discussing regulatory takings analysis). 
 182. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 183. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Seawall Assocs. v. City 
of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989). 
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1.  Landlords Claim Concerning the Burden of the RSL 
First, in challenging the RSL as an unconstitutional regulatory taking, 
landlords cast the RSL as a public assistance benefit impermissibly borne by 
landlords.184  Although this is not a new argument,185 it has been 
reinvigorated through a New York Court of Appeals decision to exempt 
debtors’ interests in their rent-stabilized leases from their bankruptcy estates 
as a “local public assistance benefit” pursuant to New York debtor and 
creditor law.186  Landlords would further add that it is an ineffective public 
assistance benefit at that.187 
Second, the Community Housing Complaint asserts that the character of 
the RSL is “precisely the type of physical invasion that weighs in favor of 
finding a regulatory taking.”188  Landlords claim the RSL is effectively a 
physical invasion of property because it strips regulated property owners of 
their “right to possess, use and dispose” of their apartments,189 as well as the 
“right to exclude others.”190  In effect, landlords argue the RSL is physical in 
character because it works to transfer property rights from owners to their 
tenants.191 
Third, the Community Housing Complaint attempts to demonstrate an 
overwhelming economic impact effectuated by the RSL on owners of, and 
 
 184. Complaint, supra note 7, at 112–14; see Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
 185. See Timothy L. Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation:  
Finding a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293, 1318 
(1996). 
 186. See In re Santiago-Monteverde, 22 N.E.3d 1012, 1014–15 (N.Y. 2014) (answering the 
following certified question in the affirmative:  “Whether a debtor-tenant possesses a property 
interest in the protected value of her rent-stabilized lease that may be exempted from her 
bankruptcy estate pursuant to New York State Debtor and Creditor Law Section 282(2) as a 
local public assistance benefit”). 
 187. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining landlords’ argument that the RSL does not help 
low-income New Yorkers). 
 188. Complaint, supra note 7, at 114; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (determining that regulation that “can be characterized as a physical 
invasion” of property is more likely to be found a regulatory taking under the Penn Central 
test). 
 189. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (describing 
individual property rights over physical things as the “right to possess, use and dispose” of 
those things); Complaint, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 190. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing the right 
to exclude others as “one of the most essential” property rights).  More recently, the Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed the importance of the property right to exclude others by striking down 
a California regulation allowing union organizers access to growers’ property as a physical 
taking.  See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072–74 (2021). 
 191. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 70–71.  In the plaintiffs’ facial physical takings 
challenge, they claim that the RSL effectuates a physical taking of property by giving tenants 
full discretion to renew their leases, allowing judges to stay lawful evictions, limiting 
landlords’ ability to retake property for personal use, and restricting landlords’ ability to 
remove units from the rental market or convert them into co-ops or condos. See id. at 63–88.  
While this Note does not seek to address the Community Housing Improvement Program 
physical takings claim in depth, it is relevant to the assessment of the character of the RSL 
under the Penn Central test. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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investors in, rent-stabilized property.192  Landlords point to the discrepancy 
in rental rates between free-market and rent-stabilized apartments.193  
According to the 2017 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS), 
the median contract rent for regulated units was $1269 per month, a 2.6 
percent increase from 2014.194  In comparison, the median rent for 
unregulated units was $1700, a 10 percent increase from 2014.195  
Additionally, the RGB estimates that while “owner costs have increased 
5.4% [annually] on average over the last 20 years . . . the RGB’s approved 
rent guideline increases have increased . . . 2.7% per year [on average] over 
that period.”196  Further, the RGB’s 2020 net commensurate rent 
adjustment197 is between 2.5 and 3.5 percent for one-year leases and between 
3.3 and 6.75 percent for two-year leases.198  However, the new 2021 RGB 
rent guidelines institute a rent freeze for one-year leases and only a 1 percent 
increase for the second year of a two-year lease.199  Landlords argue they 
cannot be made to rely solely on RGB increases for a reasonable return on 
investment, as the 2019 HSTPA intends.200 
Further, the Community Housing Complaint alleges that the RSL greatly 
diminishes the value of stabilized units compared to those on the free 
market.201  Even before the HSTPA was enacted, property assessments by 
the New York City Department of Finance showed that “the market value of 
a building with 25% or fewer regulated units had a per square foot market 
value ($233/sq. ft.) of more than double the value of buildings in which 75% 
 
 192. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 92–112. 
 193. See id. at 93. 
 194. SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY 
SURVEY, supra note 18, at 21.  The HVS is the only survey that provides data specifically for 
rent-stabilized tenants. See RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2020 INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY 17 
(2020), https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-
IE.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRU9-8DYL]. 
 195. SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY 
SURVEY, supra note 18, at 21; see also Complaint, supra note 7, at 93 (claiming that the RSL 
has led one landlord to charge 70- to 80-percent-lower rent for regulated apartments than for 
comparable nonregulated apartments in the same building). 
 196. Complaint, supra note 7, at 94. 
 197. The commensurate rent adjustment, “[i]n its simplest form, . . . is the amount of rent 
change needed to maintain owners’ current dollar [net operating income] for their 
rent-stabilized apartments at a constant level.” N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2020 PRICE 
INDEX OF OPERATING COSTS 10 (2020), https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/2020-PIOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/44PG-ZYDP]. 
 198. See id.  The RGB calculates multiple commensurate rent adjustment rates using 
different formulas. See MATTHEW MURPHY & MARK WILLIS, NYU FURMAN CTR., THE 
CHALLENGES OF BALANCING RENT STABILITY, FAIR RETURN, AND PREDICTABILITY UNDER 
NEW YORK’S RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 5 (2019) (explaining the differences between the 
five separate commensurate rent adjustment formulas). 
 199. See Kelly Mena, New York City Passes Rent Freeze for Stabilized Apartments, CNN 
(June 18, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/new-york-rent-
freeze/index.html [https://perma.cc/J47R-ZQKT] (discussing rent relief efforts taken in 
response to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 200. Complaint, supra note 7, at 89. 
 201. Id. at 95–99. 
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or more of the units were regulated ($97/sq. ft.).”202  After the HSTPA’s 
enactment, the sales values of buildings with rent-regulated apartments 
plummeted.203  According to various brokers and investors, the value of 
buildings with regulated apartments has fallen “about 25% on average.”204  
In response, landlords have greatly reduced spending on apartment 
renovations.205  Frank Ricci, executive vice president of the Rent 
Stabilization Association (RSA), claims the RSL “remove[s] incentive[s] to 
do upgrades beyond the minimum,” and others in the industry warn of decay 
of the housing stock.206 
Fourth, landlords contend that the RSL substantially interferes with 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.207  The ETPA’s legislative 
finding provides that “the transition from regulation to a normal market of 
free bargaining between landlord and tenant [is] . . . the ultimate objective of 
state policy.”208  Property owners argue that they should be able to rely on 
this representation when investing, yet the 2019 HSTPA imposes more 
regulation, not less.209 
The Community Housing Complaint asserts that the 2019 HSTPA 
“dramatically exacerbate[s] the regulatory takings effected by the RSL.”210  
Landlords argue that the repeal of statutory vacancy and longevity rent 
increases effectively eliminates their ability to increase the rent above RGB 
guidelines, which consistently trail the annual increase in owners’ operation 
costs, preventing a fair return on investment.211  Landlords also argue that 
the elimination of luxury and high-rent decontrol destroys investment-backed 
expectations that a unit may eventually be removed from rent stabilization 
 
 202. Id. at 97. 
 203. See Josh Barbanel, Sales of New York City Rent-Regulated Buildings Plummet After 
New Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sales-of-new-
york-city-rent-regulated-buildings-plummet-after-new-law-11582754189 [https://perma.cc/ 
RYZ9-U9WN] (“The value of sales for buildings with at least one rent-regulated apartment 
dropped by more than $4.1 billion in the second half of 2019 compared with the same period 
the year before.”). 
 204. Will Parker & Konrad Putzier, Buyers Return After Rent-Control Slams New York 
Apartment Values, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/buyers-return-after-rent-control-slams-new-york-apartment-values-11580817601 
[https://perma.cc/G33P-MNQ4] (reporting that buyers have returned to take advantage of a 
large drop in value in rent-stabilized buildings as current owners struggle to make loan 
payments). 
 205. See Barbanel, supra note 113 (reporting a 44-percent decrease in renovation projects 
for rent regulated buildings). 
 206. See id.  But see David Hershey-Webb, The Intended Consequences of the HSTPA, 
N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 10, 2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/ 
12/10/the-intended-consequences-of-the-hstpa/ [https://perma.cc/VG5J-VCQC] (noting that 
no previous predictions of widespread dilapidated housing due to rent regulation have come 
to pass and claiming that “the real estate industry is starting to sound like the proverbial boy 
who cried wolf”). 
 207. Complaint, supra note 7, at 99–100. 
 208. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8622 (McKinney 2019). 
 209. Complaint, supra note 7, at 99–100. 
 210. Id. at 101. 
 211. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the 
effects of the HSTPA amendments on landlords’ property interests). 
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and released into the free market.212  Further, landlords contend they cannot 
collect reasonable returns on MCIs and IAIs under the new regulations.213  
According to permit application records, “[t]he median interior renovation 
project costs $60,000,” dwarfing the HSTPA’s allowable recovery cap of 
$15,000 for IAIs.214  Landlords argue that even for improvements under 
$15,000, “[o]nce the taxes associated with additional rent revenue is 
considered,” landlords are unlikely to even recover the cost of investment.215  
Plaintiffs also claim that the HSTPA’s formula for recovery of MCI expenses 
makes it difficult for landlords to recoup their investments, much less earn a 
reasonable return.216 
Overall, landlords claim that the RSL, on its face:  (1) is physical in 
character, (2) drastically reduces the economic value of stabilized units, and 
(3) destroys reasonable investment-backed expectations, thus satisfying the 
regulatory takings test under Penn Central. 
2.  The Inapplicability of Facial Challenges to Regulatory Takings 
The district court’s dismissal of the landlords’ facial regulatory takings 
challenge pointed squarely to the inapplicability of such broad challenges to 
the RSL.217  The decision cites United States v. Salerno,218 where the 
Supreme Court declared that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of 
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
Act would be valid.”219  In particular, precedent asserts that regulatory 
takings challenges are especially ill-suited for facial analysis because of the 
ad hoc and fact-intensive nature of the Penn Central test.220 
 
 212. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 103. 
 213. See id. at 103–07 (claiming that even before the 2019 Amendments, the MCI and IAI 
regulations imposed a heavy financial burden, but now even recovery of the investment is 
unlikely); supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the MCI and IAI amendments). 
 214. Barbanel, supra note 113. 
 215. Complaint, supra note 7, at 105. 
 216. See id. at 106–07; supra Part I.C.2. 
 217. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 44–
45 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (submitting that 
while the legislature could someday “apply the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back” 
and push the RSL into a regulatory taking, “it is unlikely that the straw in question will be 
identified in the context of a facial challenge.”). 
 218. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 219. Id. at 745; see Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 45.  But see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 941–
42 (2011) (using empirical data to challenge the assertion that facial challenges are especially 
difficult to win). 
 220. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988) (“Given the ‘essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiry’ involved in the takings analysis, we have found it particularly important in 
takings cases to adhere to our admonition that ‘the constitutionality of statutes ought not be 
decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary.’” (citation 
omitted) (first quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); and then 
quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 294–95 (1981)); 
W. 95 Hous. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 31 F. App’x. 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he difficulty of such an assessment suggests that a widely applicable rent control 
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In addition, the district court noted that it is bound by prior Second Circuit 
decisions specifically rejecting regulatory takings challenges to the RSL.221  
For example, in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal,222 the Second Circuit found 
that the RSL did not deprive the plaintiff of “economically viable use of the 
property” even if the plaintiff “will not profit as much as it would under a 
market-based system.”223  The district court also noted that the Second 
Circuit has disparaged previous attempts to challenge the RSL under a facial 
takings claim.224 
The district court applied the Penn Central factors to demonstrate the 
inapplicability of the landlords’ facial regulatory takings challenge to the 
RSL.225  First, the court determined that economic impact “obviously needs 
to be calculated on an owner-by-owner basis.”226  Accordingly, the court 
determined the landlords’ claim necessarily failed because it offered only 
vague allegations about the average diminution in value to regulated property 
in general.227  Second, the court determined that reasonable 
investment-backed expectations vary depending on the regulatory scheme in 
place at the time of investment.228  Therefore, the court determined that the 
landlords’ claim inappropriately asked it to assess the impact of the RSL on 
investment-backed expectations at large, regardless of when an individual 
owner entered the market or what that owner’s specific expectations were.229  
Third, having already rejected the landlords’ arguments regarding economic 
diminution and investment-backed expectations, the court determined the 
plaintiffs could not prevail on claims that relied solely on the character of the 
 
regulation such as the RSL is not susceptible to a facial constitutional analysis under the 
Takings Clause.”); Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(finding that to determine whether an RSL provision effectuated a regulatory taking, the court 
must “engage in an ad hoc factual inquiry for each landlord who alleges that he has suffered 
a taking” rather than assess the law in the abstract); David Zhou, Comment, Rethinking the 
Facial Takings Claim, 120 YALE L.J. 967, 970–71 (2011).  But see Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We assume, without deciding, that a facial 
challenge can be made under Penn Central.”), cert denied, 563 U.S. 988 (2011). 
 221. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 38, 44 (“[E]very 
regulatory-takings challenge to the RSL has been rejected by the Second Circuit.”). 
 222. 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 223. Id. at 48 (determining the plaintiff’s property had economic value under the RSL 
because “it may still rent apartments and collect regulated rents”). 
 224. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (first citing W. 95 
Hous. Corp., 31 F. App’x at 21; and then citing Rent Stabilization Ass’n, 5 F.3d at 596). 
 225. See id. at 46–47. 
 226. Id. at 46. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 46–47 (citing various 
Second Circuit opinions in support of this proposition); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at the 
time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those 
expectations.”).  But see id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the notion that existing 
restrictions, other than those forming “background principles” of state property law, have any 
bearing on an assessment of investment-backed expectations in a takings challenge). 
 229. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 47. 
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regulation prong of the Penn Central test.230  Therefore, the district court 
dismissed the landlords’ regulatory takings claim.231 
B.  Does the RSL Violate Due Process of Law? 
The Court previously held that due process challenges to rent regulation 
statutes are subject to rational basis review.232  Therefore, a successful due 
process challenge to a rent regulation must show that the measure is either 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or not rationally related to a legitimate legislative 
purpose.233 
1.  Landlords’ Belief Regarding the RSL’s Means and Ends 
In Community Housing Improvement Program, landlords attacked the 
RSL as a violation of due process by invoking the standard set in Pennell, 
claiming the RSL is an “irrational, arbitrary and demonstrably irrelevant 
means to address its stated policy ends.”234  In fact, they argue that not only 
is the RSL not rationally related to the stated goals of the legislature, but it 
often works against them.235  Landlords take particular issue with the notion 
that the RSL is rationally related to:  (1) providing low-income New Yorkers 
with affordable housing, (2) promoting socioeconomic diversity, and (3) 
increasing the supply of affordable housing.236  Further, they have 
characterized property as a fundamental right and implored the court to 
employ a stricter standard of review.237 
First, landlords asserted that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving 
the goal of providing low-income New Yorkers with affordable housing.238  
The RSL contains no mechanism to match low-income renters with 
rent-stabilized units.239  Apartments under the RSL are offered to the public 
at large without regard to the financial status of the renter.240  Landlords 
 
 230. See id.  Additionally, the court dismissed the landlords’ facial physical takings 
challenge to the RSL, effectively deciding that the RSL’s character is not that of a physical 
invasion of property. See id. at 43; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 
(1992) (rejecting a physical takings challenge to a rent control ordinance on the basis that the 
“laws at issue . . . merely regulate petitioners’ use of their land by regulating the relationship 
between landlord and tenant” and do not compel owners to suffer a physical invasion). 
 231. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 47. 
 232. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988). 
 233. See, e.g., id.; see also Manheim, supra note 172, at 945–46. 
 234. Complaint, supra note 7, at 28; see also Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11. 
 235. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 
 236. See id. at 51–52. 
 237. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 29 (“Defendants must demonstrate that the RSL is 
narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling governmental purpose.”). 
 238. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; Complaint, supra 
note 7, at 33 (quoting Matthew Murphy, former Deputy Commissioner of Policy and Strategy 
at the New York City Department of Housing, Preservation, and Development, as claiming 
that the RSL is a “critical resource” in providing lower-income households the choice to live 
in New York City). 
 239. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 33. 
 240. See id. 
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argue that the lack of targeting effectively turns the RSL housing stock into 
a lottery where winners are chosen at random.241 
The Community Housing Complaint lists numerous instances of wealthy 
tenants with luxurious vacation homes refusing to part with rent-stabilized 
units despite clearly not needing the RSL’s protection from the free 
market.242  The Wall Street Journal reported that, in practice, affluent 
residents are the biggest beneficiaries of rent regulation in New York.243  
Further, landlords argue that the RSL does not serve significantly more low-
income renters than the free market.244  The NYU Furman Center published 
data for 2011 showing that 65.8 percent of rent-stabilized tenants are 
considered low-income, while 53.8 percent of tenants living in market-rate 
units are considered low-income.245 
Landlords point to the HSTPA’s elimination of luxury and high-rent 
decontrol as evidence of the contradiction between the RSL and its policy 
goal of providing affordable housing to low-income tenants or protecting the 
tenancies of vulnerable tenants.246  They argue that the only people 
benefitting from these amendments are wealthy New Yorkers who now will 
not lose the protection of the RSL no matter how high their income or rent 
grows.247 
Second, landlords assert that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving 
the goal of ensuring socioeconomic or racial diversity in New York City 
communities.248  They insist the disconnect is based on many of the same 
 
 241. See id.; see also McPherson, supra note 45, at 1127 (criticizing the RSL for 
indiscriminately providing benefits without regard to tenants’ needs, creating a “culture of 
‘rental envy’” for those not fortunate enough to obtain a regulated apartment). 
 242. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 34–35 (listing examples of wealthy tenants residing 
in rent-stabilized apartments). 
 243. See Josh Barbanel, Wealthy, Older Tenants in Manhattan Get Biggest Boost from Rent 
Regulations, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wealthy-
older-tenants-in-manhattan-get-biggest-boost-from-rent-regulations-11560344400 
[https://perma.cc/KJY4-UW85] (reporting that the biggest discounts between regulated and 
market rent occur in high-income neighborhoods and are captured by high-income residents, 
providing “a policy conundrum” for state lawmakers who favor strengthening the RSL); see 
also CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, RENT REGULATION:  BEYOND THE RHETORIC 11 (2010), 
https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/REPORT_RentReg_06022010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3AX-P8YA] (“The greatest percentage discounts [created by the RSL] are 
for those with incomes below $20,000 annually and for those with incomes between $125,000 
and $175,000.”). 
 244. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 36. 
 245. NYU FURMAN CTR., PROFILE OF RENT-STABILIZED UNITS AND TENANTS IN NEW YORK 
CITY 4 (2014), https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_FactBrief_RentStabilization_ 
June2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6HY-96AE].  The report defines low-income households as 
those “earning no more than 80 percent of the Area Median Income.” Id. at 1 n.2.  The 
plaintiffs point to the NYU Furman Center in support of their argument that the RSL is not 
rationally related to providing low-income New Yorkers with affordable housing. See 
Complaint, supra note 7, at 36.  But see Memo for the Defendant, supra note 18, at 26 (“Even 
taking Plaintiffs’ allegations at face value, they concede that a substantial portion, if not a 
majority, of rent-stabilized housing is occupied by low- to middle-income residents.”). 
 246. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 35; supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 35; supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
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reasons as those explaining why the RSL does not provide affordable housing 
for low-income New Yorkers, namely that the RSL is not targeted at serving 
minority groups or promoting diversity.249  In fact, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that “[w]hite renters in rent-protected apartments benefited more 
than any other race group.”250  Further, the Community Housing Complaint 
lists several scholarly works asserting that rent regulation in general is “an 
ineffective tool for economic and racial integration.”251 
Third, landlords assert that the RSL is not rationally related to achieving 
the goal of increasing the supply of affordable housing.252  They claim the 
RSL perpetuates the housing crisis because it does not increase the vacancy 
rate.253 
The RSL exerts price control over regulated properties, which landlords 
argue reduces the incentive for owners to fully develop and maintain their 
existing properties or invest in building new housing.254  Landlords 
petitioned the court to heed the warnings of the majority of economists 
asserting that rent regulation does “substantially more harm than good.”255  
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, in evaluating San 
Francisco’s rent regulations, noted that 93 percent of the American Economic 
Association’s members agreed that rent ceilings reduced the quality and 
quantity of housing.256  Krugman added that “[a]lmost every freshman-level 
textbook” explains that rent regulation thwarts the growth of the housing 
supply.257  Noted legal scholar Richard Epstein warns that all rent control 
statutes decrease owners’ returns on investment, which leads to reduced 
investment in new and existing properties and thereby exacerbates a housing 
shortage.258 
 
 249. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 51–
52 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 250. Barbanel, supra note 243 (finding that white renters of stabilized units received a 
36-percent discount from market rates, on average, while Black and Hispanic renters received 
a 16-percent and 17-percent discount, respectively). 
 251. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 40. 
 252. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; N.Y.C. COUNCIL, 
supra note 88, at 44–45 (emphasizing the New York City Council’s view of the RSL as 
important for creating and maintaining affordable housing in New York City). 
 253. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52; Complaint, supra 
note 7, at 40.  The state may not declare a housing emergency if the vacancy rate exceeds 5 
percent, ending the primary basis for the RSL. Emergency Tenant Protection Act, N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAW § 8623(b) (McKinney 2019). 
 254. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 40–41. 
 255. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 
 256. See id. at 52 (quoting Paul Krugman, Opinion, Reckonings; A Rent Affair, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 7, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/07/opinion/reckonings-a-rent-affair.html 
[https://perma.cc/57A8-3E2L]). 
 257. See id. (quoting Krugman, supra note 256). 
 258. Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 741, 767 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Rent Control]; see also Richard Epstein, The Rent 
Is Too Damn Low, HOOVER INST. (June 17, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/rent-too-
damn-low [https://perma.cc/JX5T-AG3N] [hereinafter Epstein, The Rent Is Too Damn Low] 
(labeling the 2019 HSTPA as a misguided and unconstitutional rent measure). 
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Notably, plaintiffs claim that in a self-conducted study of one hundred 
Manhattan properties chosen at random—half “heavily stabilized”259 and 
half containing no stabilized units—the regulated properties were underbuilt 
by 18 percent on average compared to their zoning capacity, while the 
unregulated properties exceeded their zoning capacity by an average of 22 
percent.260  They allege that if the fifty regulated properties were built to the 
same capacity as the unregulated properties, the housing market would be 
infused with “over 600 units of 700 square feet apiece.”261  In effect, 
landlords argue that the RSL can be empirically shown to discourage the very 
development and investment necessary to alleviate the housing shortage and 
increase the affordable housing supply.262 
Landlords insist that the 2019 HSTPA serves only to expand the 
disconnect between the RSL and its goal of increasing the supply of 
affordable housing and ending the housing crisis.263  In particular, they point 
out that the elimination of luxury and high-income decontrol strips landlords’ 
ability to remove units from a counterproductive system.264  Likewise, 
landlords argue that the elimination of statutory vacancy and longevity 
increases further reduces an owner’s return on investment, which leads to 
reduced investment in existing and new properties.265 
In addition, landlords argue that the HSTPA’s limitations on the recovery 
of IAIs and MCIs will reduce owners’ returns on investment and discourage 
landlords from properly maintaining their properties.266  They insist this will 
result in a drastic reduction in the quality of New York’s housing stock—to 
the point that units become uninhabitable and are pulled from the market, 
thereby ultimately decreasing the quantity of affordable housing.267 
Landlords also challenge New York City’s declaration of a housing 
emergency (which triggers the RSL) as a violation of due process, claiming 
the 5 percent vacancy rate threshold268 and the declaration itself are 
arbitrary.269  First, landlords argue that the 5-percent vacancy rate threshold 
 
 259. Complaint, supra note 7, at 43 (defining the term “heavily stabilized,” for purposes of 
the study, as a building where 75 percent or more of the units are stabilized). 
 260. Id.  Properties can exceed their zoning capacity through “grants of special exceptions, 
acquisition of air rights, or grandfathered buildings built under different zoning rules.” Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See id. at 42–44; see also Krugman, supra note 256 (explaining how the principles of 
supply and demand dictate that rent regulation will not create more affordable housing). 
 263. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48. 
 264. See id. at 45; see also Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 
F. Supp. 3d 33, 51–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 265. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45; see also Epstein, Rent Control, supra note 258, at 
767 (explaining that reductions in landlords’ returns on investment lead to reductions in new 
investments, which exacerbate housing shortages). 
 266. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48; supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (explaining the 
HSTPA amendments to IAIs and MCIs and discussing landlords’ fears that the HSTPA 
changes to IAIs and MCIs do not allow for a reasonable return on investment). 
 267. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 45–48; supra notes 113, 206 and accompanying text. 
 268. A local government may declare that a housing emergency exists when the housing 
vacancy rate is 5 percent or lower. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. 
LAW § 8623(b). 
 269. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 
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set by the ETPA, under which a local government may declare a housing 
emergency, is arbitrary because the legislature did not explain why it picked 
that specific percentage.270  Further, the 5-percent threshold has not been 
adjusted or justified since it was adopted in 1974.271 
Second, landlords complain that the New York City Council reflexively 
votes to affirm the existence of a housing emergency every three years 
without any meaningful discussion as to whether a housing emergency 
actually exists.272 
Overall, landlords are adamant that the RSL is demonstrably not rationally 
related to achieving its policy goals.273  They further allege that the existence 
of the RSL is based on an arbitrary declaration of a housing emergency.274  
Thus, landlords petitioned the court to strike down the RSL as a violation of 
due process.275 
2.  The Highly Deferential Nature of Rational Basis Review 
Faced with scathing rebukes to rent regulation by economists and 
empirical evidence suggesting the RSL is detached from its policy goals,276 
the district court rejected plaintiffs’ due process claim.277  The court made 
clear that they are “engaged in rational-basis review . . . not strict 
scrutiny.”278  Therefore, absent a showing of arbitrariness, irrationality, or 
complete irrelevance to legitimate legislative goals, “the [c]ourt is bound to 
defer to legislative judgments, even if economists would disagree.”279 
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,280 the Court rejected a lower court 
decision to strike down a rent control measure on the grounds that it did not 
“substantially advance any legitimate state interest.”281  The opinion 
admonished the lower court for attempting to substitute its judgment for that 
of the legislature and reaffirmed that courts are discouraged from applying 
heightened scrutiny to substantive due process challenges to economic 
 
 270. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 31. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. at 4–5; N.Y.C. COUNCIL, supra note 88, at 44–45. (stating that there is an 
“affordability crisis” in New York City’s housing market that warrants extending the 
emergency declaration but not discussing the reasons the crisis exists). 
 273. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52. 
 274. See id. at 51. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 277. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52. 
 278. See id. at 52 (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1988)).  The court 
rejected the landlords’ plea to hold the RSL to the standard of being “narrowly tailored to 
achieving a compelling governmental purpose.” Complaint, supra note 7, at 29; see supra note 
237 and accompanying text. 
 279. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 52; see also Pennell, 485 U.S. 
at 11–12; W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (rejecting a due process 
claim against an economic regulation under rational basis review and holding that “[e]ven if 
the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature 
is entitled to its judgment”). 
 280. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 281. Id. at 536. 
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regulations.282  In the case at hand, the court followed Lingle’s holding and 
took a highly deferential approach to the RSL.283 
Further, the court noted that even if the RSL is not rationally related to 
alleviating the housing emergency, the regulation can still be held valid if it 
is rationally related to one of its other legislative purposes.284  Here, the court 
found that the RSL is definitively rationally related to its goal of allowing 
low-income New Yorkers to remain in their settled residences.285 
The court also noted the landlords’ argument that the housing emergency 
declaration was an arbitrary use of legislative power but did not directly 
address the claim.286  This argument was likely rejected by the court similarly 
opting to defer such decisions to the legislature.  Overall, the court’s decision 
largely hinged on the deference afforded to legislatures under rational basis 
review.287 
III.  LANDLORDS’ FAILURE TO STRIKE DOWN THE NEW RSL 
This part argues that the district court decision in Community Housing 
Improvement Program to reject the landlords’ broad attempt to strike down 
the entirety of the RSL as a regulatory taking or as a violation of due process 
was correct and must be upheld in subsequent appellate proceedings.  In 
addition, this part advocates for the following policy additions to the RSL:  
(1) pre-determined formulas to set annual regulated rent increases and (2) 
means testing to determine renter eligibility for residence in a regulated 
apartment. 
A.  The RSL Does Not Effect a Regulatory Taking 
Facial challenges alleging that the RSL, a widely applicable measure, is a 
regulatory taking are simply not conducive to the fact-intensive nature of the 
Penn Central test.288  However, the HSTPA-amended RSL goes further than 
any of its predecessors in restricting landlords’ property rights and interfering 
with their ability to make a reasonable return on their investment.289  While 
the district court correctly dismissed the landlords’ facial claims, the RSL 
should be amended to change the RGB’s rent guideline increase calculation 
 
 282. See id. at 543–45. 
 283. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. 
at 544–45, in support of its decision to reject landlords’ due process challenge). 
 284. See id. (first citing Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); then citing Thomas v. 
Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 285. See id.  It is a stated goal of the RSL to provide tenants with stability in their residency 
and ameliorate the risk of tenants being priced out of their apartments due to the ongoing 
housing shortage. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501 (finding the RSL necessary to prevent 
the “uprooting [of] long-time city residents from their communities”); Manocherian v. Lenox 
Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 484 (N.Y. 1994) (finding that the main purpose of the RSL is to 
“ameliorate the dislocations and risk of widespread lack of suitable dwellings”). 
 286. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 
 287. See id. at 51–52. 
 288. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 289. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1. 
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procedure to better achieve the RGB’s stated concern of providing “fair 
returns for affected owners.”290 
1.  The RSL’s Susceptibility to Facial Regulatory Takings Challenges 
The district court correctly rejected the landlords’ argument that the 2019 
RSL, on its face, effectuates a regulatory taking of property.291  In Salerno, 
the Court warned that a facial challenge to a legislative act is “the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully.”292  While this general proposition 
may be overstated,293 there is not much debate over the immense difficulty 
of asserting facial regulatory takings claims.294 
Confronted with abundant precedent displaying contempt for such 
challenges, landlords cited to the recent City of Los Angeles v. Patel295 
decision, where the Court, noting the difficulty inherent in facial challenges, 
stated it has “never held that [facial challenges] cannot be brought under any 
otherwise enforceable provision of the Constitution.”296  Reliance on Patel 
does nothing to save the landlords’ claim from the same treatment given to 
other facial regulatory takings challenges to the RSL.297  First, Patel 
addressed the applicability of facial challenges brought under the Fourth 
Amendment, not facial regulatory takings claims.298  Second, while landlords 
may not be precluded from merely bringing facial challenges, Patel does not 
speak to the chances of success on the merits of such a claim.299  In fact, the 
district court aptly demonstrated the inapplicability of the landlords’ claims 
by applying the Penn Central test to show that they could not survive on the 
merits.300  Third, landlords insist that Patel rejects the notion that facial 
challenges to the RSL “must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which [the RSL] would be valid.”301  Accordingly, the standard would 
limit the test to circumstances where the RSL is a restriction for regulated 
property owners.302  Regardless of the control group, the RSL cannot be said 
to take all regulated landlords’ property without assessing the diminution in 
 
 290. COLLINS, supra note 36, at 55–56. 
 291. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 292. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 293. See Fallon, supra note 219, at 917 (“[T]he assumption that facial challenges are and 
ought to be rare . . . is false as an empirical matter and highly dubious as a normative 
proposition.”). 
 294. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 295. 576 U.S. 409 (2015). 
 296. Id. at 415; see Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 7–9. 
 297. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 412. 
 299. Cf. Fallon, supra note 219, at 964 (acknowledging that while facial challenges should 
not be categorically disfavored, “there are often good reasons why facial challenges should 
not succeed in particular cases”). 
 300. See supra Part II.A.2 (applying the Penn Central test to the regulatory takings claim). 
 301. See Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 8 (quoting Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. 
Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 302. See Memo for the Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 8. 
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value of an individual’s property and the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of the individual property owner.303 
In their appeals, landlords may take some solace in the lukewarm assertion 
offered by the Ninth Circuit in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta304:  “[w]e 
assume, without deciding, that a facial challenge can be made under Penn 
Central.”305  But they should not.  Ultimately, the court in Guggenheim found 
that the mobile home rent control ordinance at issue did not cause a facial 
regulatory taking.306  More importantly, while the court purports to be 
assessing the claim as a facial regulatory takings challenge,307 the court is 
actually conducting an as-applied analysis.308  Ultimately, facial regulatory 
challenges seeking to strike down broad regulatory schemes like the RSL are 
“vestige[s] of the pre-Lingle takings jurisprudence.”309 
Furthermore, landlords inaccurately paint themselves as forced bankrollers 
of a public welfare housing program.310  This characterization is unavailing 
to their regulatory takings claim.  The RSL merely regulates land use and the 
landlord-tenant relationship.311  The New York Court of Appeals decision to 
portray the RSL as a “local public assistance benefit” in In re 
Santiago-Monteverde should be narrowly applied.312  The court was merely 
answering a narrow certified question:  “Whether a debtor-tenant possesses 
a property interest in the protected value of her rent-stabilized lease that may 
be exempted from her bankruptcy estate pursuant to New York State Debtor 
and Creditor Law Section 282(2) as a ‘local public assistance benefit.’”313  
Therefore, the decision should be limited in scope. 
Ultimately, the district court was correct in its decision to dismiss the 
landlords’ facial regulatory takings claims because the claims could not be 
adequately assessed under the Penn Central test.  Appellate courts should 
affirm this decision and make clear that future regulatory takings challenges 
to the RSL must be narrowly pleaded as-applied. 
 
 303. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 304. 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 305. Id. at 1118. 
 306. See id. at 1113–16. 
 307. See id. at 1119. 
 308. See id. at 1118–22 (discussing the reasonableness of the individual plaintiff’s specific 
investment-backed expectation that the rent control ordinance would eventually be 
terminated). 
 309. Zhou, supra note 220, at 977.  Before Lingle, a plaintiff could allege a regulatory 
taking by demonstrating that a “land-use regulation did not ‘substantially advance’ a 
legitimate government interest.” Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 
542 (2005)).  This type of challenge was much more conducive to a facial analysis because it 
did not require plaintiff-specific facts. See id. 
 310. See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 312. See 22 N.E.3d 1012, 1015–16 (N.Y. 2014). 
 313. Id. at 1014–15. 
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2.  Curbing the RGB’s Discretion 
While landlords failed to demonstrate that the HSTPA-amended RSL 
broadly takes property from all regulated property owners, their complaint 
raises serious issues314 that may fare better if brought as-applied.315  In 
addition, the alleged deprivation of a reasonable return on investment 
effectuated by the 2019 amendments could have consequences for the 
quantity and quality of the regulated housing stock.316  This Note proposes 
that the RSL be amended to substitute the wide discretionary power of the 
RGB in setting annual rent increases with a pre-determined formula.317  Such 
a change would depoliticize the rent guidelines process, defend against 
as-applied takings challenges, and protect the regulated housing stock by 
better safeguarding owners’ reasonable returns on their investments.318 
The RGB states that a main consideration of the RSL is producing “fair 
returns” for regulated landlords, consistent with owners’ constitutional rights 
in their property.319  Part of takings jurisprudence is the ambiguous idea that 
regulation should not deprive property owners of a reasonable return on 
investment.320  Certainly, not every regulated landlord has been deprived of 
a reasonable return by the 2019 HSTPA’s enactment, but it is entirely 
 
 314. See supra Part II.B.1 (alleging that the RSL, greatly expanded by the HSTPA, caused 
a significant reduction in the value of regulated properties and deprived owners of a reasonable 
return on investment). 
 315. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 49–
50 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (denying a motion 
to dismiss certain as-applied regulatory takings claims made in the Pinehurst Complaint); see 
also supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between facial and 
as-applied challenges). 
 316. See supra notes 206, 266–67 and accompanying text; see also MURPHY & WILLIS, 
supra note 198, at 9. 
 317. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 2–4, 7 (noting that the RGB has an unusual 
amount of discretion in setting annual rent increases when compared to other jurisdictions 
with rent regulation systems). 
 318. See id. at 9 (finding that the RGB’s annual rent increase decisions “are critical to both 
affordability and the long-term quality” of the regulated housing stock); Vicki Been et al., 
Laboratories of Regulation:  Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1059 (2019) (noting that jurisdictions that endow boards with vast 
discretionary authority to set rent increases “may be vulnerable to political or other 
pressures”). 
 319. See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 55. 
 320. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (deciding 
that the regulation at issue was not a regulatory taking, in part, because owners were able to 
make a “‘reasonable return’ on [their] investment”); Prop. Owners Ass’n of N. Bergen v. Twp. 
of N. Bergen, 378 A.2d 25, 29 (N.J. 1977) (“[R]ent regulation must permit a just and 
reasonable return.” (quoting Hutton Park Gardens v. W. Orange Town Council, 350 A.2d 1, 
15 (N.J. 1975))); Complaint, supra note 7, at 90 (listing various factors courts have found 
relevant to the investment-backed expectations analysis); Epstein, Rent Control, supra note 
258, at 751.  But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 
(1982) (“[D]eprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every 
case, independently sufficient to establish a taking.”); Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. New York, 
746 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold . . . that the inability of [affected property 
owners] to receive a reasonable return on their investment by itself does not, as a matter of 
law, amount to an unconstitutional taking . . . .”); Manheim, supra note 172, at 961 (noting 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to “be made an insurer of [property owners’] anticipated gains”). 
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possible that some individual landlords have suffered this loss.321  However, 
landlords bringing as-applied regulatory takings challenges still face a 
“heavy burden” under the Penn Central test.322 
Even absent a constitutional threat, the New York State Legislature should 
consider the potential impact of the HSTPA amendments on landlords’ 
ability to earn reasonable returns, at least as it relates to the quantity and 
quality of the regulated housing stock.  The 2019 HSTPA, especially through 
its amendments limiting recovery for IAIs and MCIs and eliminating vacancy 
and preferential rent increases, constrains landlords’ ability to make 
reasonable returns on their investments.323  New York landlords and real 
estate investors warn that such burdensome regulation will lead to a decline 
in housing quality and, worse, dilapidated housing and an increase in owners 
warehousing apartments.324 
Curbing the RGB’s discretion to determine annual rent increases will 
alleviate concerns over potential, successful as-applied regulatory takings 
challenges and the degradation of the regulated housing stock.325  Although 
required to consider a number of factors, the RGB wields broad discretion in 
establishing annual allowable rent increases for RSL regulated properties.326  
The 2019 HSTPA amendments either eliminate or greatly reduce a landlord’s 
ability to raise the rent beyond the RGB annual rent guidelines, exponentially 
increasing the weight of the RGB’s discretionary authority on landlords’ 
ability to make a reasonable return on investment.327  Concerningly, the 
RGB’s increase of annual rent guidelines often lags well behind the RGB’s 
own calculation of landlords’ cost of operation increases, shrinking their net 
operating income.328  Although the RGB calculates the commensurate rent 
adjustment rate,329 it is free to decide how much weight to give the results.330 
 
 321. See Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 492 F. Supp. 3d 33, 44–
45 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3366 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (commenting that 
the RSL may well effect a regulatory taking but that such a taking is unlikely to be revealed 
through a facial challenge). 
 322. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
493 (1987)); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436; cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131 
(first citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding that a 
75-percent diminution in property value was not a taking); and then Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding that an 87.5-percent diminution in property value was not a 
taking)). 
 323. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (discussing the HSTPA amendments and their effects on 
landlords’ property interests). 
 324. See supra notes 113, 206 and accompanying text (discussing the HSTPA’s potential 
effects on the regulated housing stock); see also MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 9. 
 325. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 326. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b); MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 2–3. 
 327. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (describing the HSTPA amendments and their effects on 
landlords’ property interests). 
 328. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.  “Net Operating Income (NOI) is 
the gross revenue a property produces minus operating costs, not including any debt service.” 
MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 3. 
 329. See supra notes 197–98 (describing the commensurate rent formula). 
 330. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 4. 
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Further, the setting of the annual rent guidelines is highly vulnerable to 
undue political pressure due to the RGB’s vast discretion.331  New York City 
Mayor Bill de Blasio, who openly favors a “socialistic” planned housing 
market,332 has been open about his influence over RGB decisions.333  In 
2017, after the RGB implemented its second rent freeze in as many years, 
Mayor de Blasio boasted, “[t]hat’s never been done in history before . . . .  
That happened under this administration because I instructed the [RGB]—I 
name the members—and I instructed them to not follow the biases of the 
past.”334  It is not difficult to imagine why landlords would be skeptical of 
the RGB’s supposed concern for their fair returns and fearful about the 
increased control of the RGB over their ability to obtain a reasonable return 
on their investment.335 
To address this issue, the New York State Legislature should curb the 
discretion accorded to the RGB and adopt a pre-determined formula to set 
the rent increases for regulated properties.336  Additionally, owner operating 
costs should be based on “regional consumer price indexes produced by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.”337  However, there should be a maximum 
cap on the annual increase, regardless of the calculation, and room for 
discretion to account for unforeseen circumstances.338  Such a procedure 
would greatly depoliticize the annual task of setting regulated rent increases 
and better guard against as-applied regulatory takings challenges by 
providing a more reasonable return on investment.  It should also help to 
prevent the decline of the regulated housing stock by more closely and 
consistently tying allowable rent increases to increases in owner operating 
costs.339 
 
 331. See Sally Goldenberg, De Blasio Touts Rent Freeze He “Instructed” Board to 
Embrace, POLITICO (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/city-hall/story/2017/03/de-blasio-touts-rent-freeze-he-instructed-board-to-embrace-
110423 [https://perma.cc/9BLU-JWY5].  Relevantly, the RGB is composed of nine members, 
all appointed by the mayor. See Been et al., supra note 318, at 1060. 
 332. Chris Smith, In Conversation:  Bill de Blasio, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/bill-de-blasio-in-conversation.html 
[https://perma.cc/UC2F-GQVD] (documenting Mayor Bill de Blasio decrying the elevated 
status of private property rights in America which prevents the implementation of a planned 
housing economy and his sympathy for the “socialistic impulse” of the New York City 
community). 
 333. See Goldenberg, supra note 331. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 87–88. 
 336. New York’s reliance on discretionary board authority in setting rent increases is the 
minority position; most jurisdictions with rent regulation schemes rely on a pre-determined 
formula. See MURPHY & WILLIS, supra note 198, at 7.  This Note will not venture to prescribe 
an exact formula, but the formula will have to be one that is mutually agreeable to both tenant 
and landlord advocates. 
 337. See id.  The RGB produces its own “Price Index of Operating Costs (PIOC),” instead 
of relying on a third-party index to calculate regulated owner operating costs. Id. at 4, 7. 
 338. The COVID-19 global pandemic may be considered an unforeseen circumstance. 
 339. This Note acknowledges that a pre-determined formula will not entirely address the 
alleged issue that amendments to the RSL’s IAI and MCI provisions prevent landlords from 
recovering the costs of necessary renovations. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (discussing IAI 
and MCI effects on landlords’ property interests); see also Epstein, The Rent Is Too Damn 
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B.  The RSL Does Not Violate Due Process of Law 
Due process challenges to broad economic regulations, such as the RSL, 
that are aimed at promoting public welfare may be discarded upon the 
government’s showing of some legitimate rational basis for the measure, a 
highly deferential standard.340  In finding that such a regulation passes 
rational basis review, a court does not pass judgment on the merits of a 
legislature’s policy decision or even endorse it as an adequate means to 
achieving the legislature’s goals.341  Therefore, while the district court 
correctly dismissed the landlords’ due process claim, the constitutional 
challenge exposed fundamental flaws in the RSL’s ability to direct its 
benefits toward those who need its protection most.342  The introduction of 
means testing to the RSL can help better target the RSL to helping low- and 
middle-income New Yorkers. 
1.  The RSL Survives Rational Basis Review 
The district court correctly rejected the landlords’ attempt to strike down 
the RSL as a constitutional violation of due process.343  In Lochner v. New 
York,344 Justice Holmes famously dissented, proclaiming that “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics.”345  In doing so, he rejected the notion that the U.S. Constitution 
“embod[ies] a particular economic theory”346 and set the foundation for the 
Court’s modern substantive due process jurisprudence, which affords a 
legislature a high level of deference in adjusting economic burdens.347  The 
decision in Community Housing Improvement Project echoes Justice 
Holmes’s dissent by refusing to supplant the rational judgment of New 
York’s democratically elected legislature with the economic theories of Paul 
 
Low, supra note 258 (claiming that the costs of renovation projects cannot be recovered under 
the new provisions and positing that the new law goes too far and constitutes a taking). 
 340. See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
 341. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 486–
87 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 342. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing landlords’ claim that the RSL fails to adequately 
provide low-income renters with affordable housing). 
 343. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 344. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The Court struck down an economic regulation limiting working 
hours for bakers as a violation of due process.  See generally id. 
 345. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics is an endorsement 
of social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court History:  
Capitalism and Conflict, THIRTEEN (Dec. 2006), https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/ 
capitalism/history2.hhtm [https://perma.cc/9XFW-48CL].  Justice Holmes’s statement was 
intended as criticism of the majority’s willingness to allow partiality for a particular economic 
theory, such as Herbert Spencer’s, to override the will of the democratic majority. See id.; 
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 346. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
 347. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is 
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of 
harmony with a particular school of thought.”). 
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Krugman and Professor Richard Epstein as they relate to rent regulation’s 
ability to alleviate the effects of a housing emergency.348 
The RSL is a highly politically contentious measure, with fervent 
supporters and detractors.349  The fact that reasonable minds could disagree 
over the merits of the RSL is evidence that the RSL is not hopelessly 
disconnected from its policy objectives.350  At its core, the RSL is charged 
with “prevent[ing] exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents 
and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other 
disruptive practices” during a housing emergency.351  The RSL’s regulation 
of rent increases and tenant evictions is surely aimed at achieving these ends.  
Additionally, the RSL does ensure that some housing remains affordable for 
New Yorkers through rent regulation, and 65.8 percent of those protected by 
the RSL are low-income tenants.352 
Furthermore, the landlords’ characterization of the 2019 HSTPA 
amendments as furthering the RSL’s drift from the legislature’s policy goals 
is unavailing.353  Amendments eliminating luxury and high-income 
decontrol, vacancy increases, and restricting IAIs and MCIs were direct 
responses to rapid deregulation and the threat of the permanent loss of 
affordable housing enabled by the prior RSL regime.354 
While it is possible that there are objectively better policy options geared 
toward providing affordable housing in the midst of a housing shortage with 
less interference to property interests, it is too far to label the RSL as devoid 
of any rational connection to its policy goals.  Thus, the landlords’ due 
process claim must fail in subsequent attempts to revive the argument at the 
appellate level. 
2.  Targeting Low- and Middle-Income Renters Through Means Testing 
The RSL has been touted as a vital tool in providing lower income tenants 
the opportunity to afford living in New York City.355  However, landlords 
correctly note that the 2019 RSL contains no mechanism to direct the RSL’s 
 
 348. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing Paul Krugman’s and Richard Epstein’s criticism of 
rent regulation statutes). 
 349. See RENT REGULATION AFTER 50 YEARS, supra note 45, at 1; supra notes 2, 79 and 
accompanying text. 
 350. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that where reasonable 
minds differ as to the soundness of an economic regulation, it is not the Court’s place to strike 
it down as a violation of due process); see also Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is:  
A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41, 1248 (1989) 
(defending the general constitutionality of rent regulation and the RSL’s effectiveness in 
providing tenants with an important sense of stability and community); Dean Preston & Shanti 
Singh, Dear Business School Professors:  You’re Wrong, Rent Control Works, SHELTERFORCE 
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/03/28/rent-control-works/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7VRE-PT66] (arguing that rent regulation is effective policy and disputing certain economic 
studies suggesting the opposite as methodologically flawed). 
 351. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501. 
 352. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 354. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra note 238. 
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protection toward New York’s low- and middle-income renters.356  Despite 
landlords’ arguments to the contrary, this disconnect is not fatal to the RSL 
under due process analysis.357  First, the RSL does in fact house a large 
number of low-income renters, providing them with affordable rent.358  
Second, the RSL is rationally related to many other goals, such as generally 
preserving affordable housing in New York City359 and providing tenants 
with housing stability through protection from unreasonable and 
unpredictable rent increases.360  Although under no compulsion from due 
process legal challenges, the New York State Legislature should modify the 
RSL regime to better direct the RSL’s benefits toward assisting those who 
actually need protection from the hardships associated with a free market 
during a housing emergency.361  This policy goal can be accomplished by 
adding a means test to the RSL.362 
The legislature should adopt means testing to ensure that the RSL’s 
benefits are focused on low- and middle-income tenants, to the exclusion of 
wealthy tenants.363  The means test would only allow low- and 
middle-income tenants to be eligible for a stabilized apartment and the RSL’s 
protection.364  Such a test would require stabilized tenants to submit a yearly 
tax return to the DHCR to show that they still qualify for RSL protection.365  
To avoid abrupt disruptions of occupancy, tenants would have to show an 
income over the specified threshold for a consecutive number of years before 
being given a reasonable amount of time to vacate the regulated apartment 
and relocate.  Such a measure would increase the availability of affordable 
regulated units for low- and middle-income tenants.  Additionally, unlike the 
prior RSL’s luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions, the proposed measure 
would not deregulate the apartment itself; after reaching a certain threshold 
 
 356. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.B.1. 
 357. See supra Parts II.B.2, III.B.1. 
 358. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 361. The RSL has allowed wealthy tenants to obtain stabilized apartments and take 
advantage of the RSL’s protection despite being perfectly capable of competitively transacting 
in the unregulated housing market. See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.  The 
HSTPA’s elimination of the RSL’s luxury and high-rent decontrol provisions removed any 
statutory means of preventing wealthy tenants from benefitting from the RSL. See supra notes 
246–47 and accompanying text. 
 362. See Konrad Putzier, The Long View:  The Fix That Could Create Thousands of 
Affordable Housing Units Overnight, REAL DEAL (Dec. 21, 2016, 1:53 PM), 
https://therealdeal.com/2016/12/21/the-fix-that-could-create-thousands-of-affordable-
housing-units-overnight [https://perma.cc/3YUS-GVDU]. 
 363. This Note does not attempt to place exact thresholds for qualifying a person as low-, 
middle-, or high-income for purposes of RSL eligibility.  However, the scope for low- and 
middle-income should be sufficiently wide as to only exclude those who clearly do not need 
protection from the unregulated housing market. 
 364. This restriction would not be enforced retroactively.  It would take effect only after 
the tenant currently occupying a regulated unit at the time of enactment has vacated the unit. 
 365. See Putzier, supra note 362 (describing how an RSL income-based means test could 
be modeled). 
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rent, it would merely remove the means testing requirement.366  In doing so, 
the proposed measure would both preserve the regulated housing stock and 
more efficiently pair affordable units with renters who need the RSL’s 
protection from New York’s unregulated housing market amidst a housing 
crisis. 
Currently, no jurisdiction employing a rent regulation scheme utilizes a 
means test as a tenant qualification.367  The primary arguments against such 
a policy are that it imposes high administrative costs and that it is detrimental 
to garnering broad political support for rent regulation.368  However, these 
arguments do not pose insurmountable barriers preventing the adoption of 
means testing to the RSL.  First, New York already employs means testing 
in its Mitchell-Lama housing program,369 and the RSL can use this as a model 
for its administration of RSL means testing.370  Second, efficiently directing 
the RSL’s benefits toward low- and middle-income tenants can help reduce 
spending elsewhere on the creation and preservation of affordable 
housing.371  Third, this Note contends that a progressive city like New York 
City may well support an effort aimed at providing low- and middle-income 
tenants with affordable housing, even if it means that a particular voter will 
be, or may become, ineligible to rent a stabilized apartment. 
CONCLUSION 
The HSTPA is the strongest, most tenant-friendly version of New York’s 
RSL in history.  Despite the increased restrictions on landlords’ property 
interests, the district court correctly rejected landlords’ attempt to dismantle 
the entire RSL regime as an unconstitutional regulatory taking or a violation 
of due process.  However, the constitutional challenge exposed legal and 
policy concerns that stem from the new RSL amendments.  Tying annual rent 
increases to a pre-determined formula, as opposed to the wide discretion of 
the RGB, will better ensure that landlords have the opportunity to earn a 
reasonable return and incentivize owners to maintain the regulated housing 
stock.  Additionally, employing a means test to determine tenant eligibility 
 
 366. This threshold rent for removing the means test would need to be set at a price 
prohibitively higher than could be afforded by a low- to middle-income renter. 
 367. See Been et al., supra note 318, at 1054. 
 368. See id. at 1053–54; Putzier, supra note 362. 
 369. The Mitchell-Lama Rehabilitation and Preservation Program offers building 
developers “low-cost financing” for housing construction projects in exchange for keeping 
rents in those buildings affordable for a specified period of time. See Directory of NYC 
Housing Programs:  Mitchell-Lama Rehabilitation and Preservation Program (RAP),  
NYU FURMAN CTR., https://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/mitchell-lama-
rehabilitation-and-preservation-program [https://perma.cc/CA8N-YHMT] (last visited Sept. 
17, 2021). 
 370. See Putzier, supra note 362. 
 371. Seth Pinsky, former head of the New York City Economic Development Corporation, 
in discussing means testing for the RSL, claimed that the city is “spending billions [on 
affordable housing programs], when overnight we could free up tens of thousands of units at 
no cost.” Putzier, supra note 362; see also Adam Zeidal, Affordable Housing:  The Case for 
Demand-Side Subsidies in Superstar Cities, 42 URB. LAW. 135, 140–41 (2010) (discussing the 
high costs associated with New York City’s affordable housing developer subsidy programs). 
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for regulated units will better target the RSL toward providing affordable 
housing for low- and middle-income New Yorkers.  Advocates on both sides 
should be willing to address these concerns and seriously consider these 
policy proposals. 
